

# ONEIRIC, ARCHETYPICAL AND WAKEFUL FORMS OF THOUGHT

## A CRITIQUE OF JUNG'S THEORY OF ARCHETYPES

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### Introduction

Carl Gustav JUNG is preeminent among the theoreticians of psychology in pointing out the similarity between the content of dreams and that of earlier modes of thinking in a variety of cultures - or rather of what we can refer to as „primitive“ thinking, in the value neutral sense of the term.<sup>1</sup> He has carried out wide-ranging comparisons of countless mythological motifs. These motifs JUNG called „archetypes,“ which are defined by him as

„... specific forms and groups of images which occur not only at all times and in all places but also in individual dreams, fantasies, visions, and delusional ideas. Their frequent appearance in individual case material, as well as their universal distribution, proves that the human psyche is unique and subjective or personal only in part, and for the rest is collective and objective“(1948b, p. 291).

Construed etymologically, the word „archetype“ means the first, original, or outstanding (*archos*) type (*typos*). Archetypes recur universally as motifs in works of art, in ritual and ceremony, and as religious symbols; finally they inform the dreams and fantasies of ordinary people, and in this capacity they may function as instantiations of neuroses and psychoses. According to JUNG, these motifs appear in different domains, places and times because they live in the collective unconscious that constitutes any individual human mind.

What we shall undertake to show here is that JUNG's assumption of a collective unconscious does not offer a convincing explanation of the phenomenon itself of the commonness of the contents of imagery which is found in so many different cultures and domains. JUNG's argument is clearly tautological. From the phenomenon of the commonness of such content, JUNG infers the existence of a collective unconscious.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless the commonness of contents is of great interest, and needs to be explained taking a critical approach to this part of JUNG's theory. We shall therefore propose here an alternative explanation to that offered by JUNG himself.

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<sup>1</sup> Our use of „primitive“ in speaking of earlier and ancient thought is value neutral.

<sup>2</sup> See also J. PIAGET (1969, p. 62).

A critique of archetypal thinking does not consist mainly in refutation of JUNG's argument. It must consist first in an attempt to learn in detail about archetypal thinking, which we believe is also prevalent in modern waking thought. But within the context of waking thought, the archetypal form is mixed in with other ways of thinking, and is even concealed by the latter. Dreams however are organized in a much more unalloyed fashion as regards modes of thinking, and are therefore much closer to archetypal thought. So that in order to arrive at an understanding of archetypes, we would turn to an analysis of oneiric thought.

In asserting that the similarity of the contents of dreams and primitive thought derives from a similarity between the *forms* of their thought, it may appear that we are only repeating JUNG's own argument. However, we shall argue that JUNG compares not their forms, but their *content*. In particular we shall try to show what the archetypal form is, beyond the countless variety of content set out by JUNG. No one is surprised, for example, when similar scientific discoveries are made at the same time in different and unrelated places. For we understand that it is the commonness of the scientific nomological *form* of thought which has made this possible - rather than this being the result of a common content that as it were lives somewhere in a collective unconscious. Had JUNG compared the forms of thought of archetypal contents (rather than comparing the content of such thought), he would not have needed to turn to a collective unconscious in order to explain the commonness of content.

Thus it seems to us that JUNG's analysis of the similarity of content is confusing since what emerges from it is only a manifold variety of similar contents, so that the *meaning* of the commonness has been missed. We could argue therefore that the way of thinking which produces these contents needs to be analyzed separately. Our own contribution in this regard will therefore consist in a close description of the oneiric-mythic form of thought, and principally the archetypal form.

To analyze archetypal thought, we shall first describe its alternative, which is rational waking thought. This will furnish the background for our consideration of the oneiric-mythic form of thinking, of which archetypal thought is an external development and to whose domain it in many respects also belongs. A detailed account of oneiric thought is a necessary preliminary to understanding archetypal thought, since of itself it is already a description of at least *a part* of archetypal thinking. An explanation will be offered as well of the difference between archetypal and oneiric thought.

### **The Substantiating Form of Thought**

We define forms of thought as the ways or categories in which the world is ordered in the mind. Forms of thought determine the relations among

things. More specifically, a form of thinking is the way in which a universal refers to a singular entity. By universals we try to capture and explain the singular entity. The specific characteristic of the singular entity and the universal, and their mutual relations, determine the differences between ways of ordering the world - the differences, that is, between forms of thought.<sup>3</sup>

Each form of thought delimits boundaries differently. The criteria for the affinity between entities and for division, characterization and explanation are different in each case, so there is no correlation between archetypes and genera and species. For example, we shall find the archetype of „mother“ but not the archetype of „human“; whereas in thinking by genera and species, we shall find the species of „human“ but not of „woman“. This mode of arrangement is typical of waking thought, which is based on the assumption of genera and species as universals that refer to singular entities as substances. A substance is a *substratum* that is a „carrier“ of qualities. Thus the lemon tree in my garden is, as a substance, that which has greenness, leaves, roots, etc., as its qualities. However, beyond its qualities, this tree is nothing more than an abstract *substratum* which carries these qualities.

The assumption of singular substances makes possible classification - that is, it allows the subtraction or addition of qualities to the singular entity, without also changing or voiding the entity. The universal (i. e., the genera and species) and the qualities are intended to explain and classify the singular entity, which is the substance. However, the universal does not include the uniqueness and full singularity of the entity. How, then, is a particular singular entity discerned from another, within the framework of the classification? In „substantiative“ waking thought, the *substratum* that carries the qualities is the principle of individuation; and it is this which furnishes the constancy that lies beyond the changes, and has the *capacity* of carrying qualities.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, insofar as the substance is a singular entity subordinate to the hierarchy of genera and species, it is only a principle of individuation and, consequently, only an *exemplar*.

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<sup>3</sup> About the distinction between form and content, and the historical development of forms of thought, see BALABAN (1990, pp. 3-20, pp. 129-157).

<sup>4</sup> ARISTOTLE deeply analyzed substantiative thinking. His analysis can be regarded as the self-consciousness of substantiative thought. He argues that the essence of things is eternal and can be neither produced nor destroyed. See *Metaphysics*, VII, 3, 8. VIII, 3. THOMAS AQUINAS ended a long period of terminological confusion over ARISTOTLE's texts when he correctly reduced the idea of substance to *quidditas* and to the *subjectum*. See *Summa Theologiae*, (1265-1273, I, quest. 29, a. 2, quest. 85, a. 1, a. 6).

### The Gestalt-Quality Form of Thought

Very unusual events occur in both dreams and myths. So, for example, a friend of ours dreamed that her legs had been cut off because she had not received a visa to the United States. Another friend dreamed that his mother, a respectable elderly woman, had taken off her clothes as he lay helpless and attempted to rape him. Yet another friend dreamed she had been wrongfully executed and, while dead, she spoke to her executioners in an ironic and amused way. Yet for all the extra ordinariness of dream episodes, people are not particularly astonished by them while dreaming - or at least, not to the same degree nor about the same things as that they would be if the same event were to occur in their waking life.

Our friend who dreamed that her legs were cut off felt only slight discomfort while dreaming. The friend who dreamed that his mother had tried to violate him sexually, although shocked during the dream, responded by allowing himself to be carried along by the events, attempting to dissuade his mother and even calling for help. In each case the dreamer had felt no surprise. A similar situation obtains in legends, fairy tales, and myths. The princess is only momentarily taken aback when the frog begins talking to her, and after uttering a short „oh!“ she proceeds to talk seriously with the frog about the matter in hand. We can deduce from these cases that what would be accounted as bizarre in a waking state - is natural in dreams and myths. Thus *the dream is understood and is meaningful during dreaming* and before its contents is interpreted by the waking mind.

The dream is understood during dreaming because the dreaming mind reasons after a fashion and an order which is its own. It arranges things according to categories which are not prevalent in the waking mind. Obviously what is understandable (i. e., „reasonable“) to the oneiric way of thought is not reasonable according in terms of the categories of the waking mind.

FREUD has described oneiric form of thought as an encoded message - not as something meaningful in itself, but as a coding of a content that lies in the domain of „latent ideas“ which is beyond the dream. But if FREUD is right, how do we account for the fact that the dreamer has a general feeling of comprehensibility concerning his dream *while* he is dreaming? It is not plausible that while dreaming he is also decoding the dream's message, an activity which the waking mind can undertake only after extensive training in dream analysis. Besides, such an activity implies a transition from an oneiric to a waking form of thought, and clearly this is beyond the capacity of a sleeping mind. Moreover, we have no evidence of the existence of such a process taking place during dreaming.

JUNG argues that being comprehensible is not part of the primary function of dreams. Moreover, according to him not everything which

influences the psyche is comprehensible (1948a, p. 294). JUNG, like FREUD, did not grasp the very indisputable fact that dreams are felt to be comprehensible during dreaming. Both men regarded dreams from the perspective of the extrinsic interpretation of waking thought. This is a mode of interpretation that seeks to understand something which is beyond the dream rather than dreams *per se*, as having a meaning of their own.

What is the logic of dreams? How is their data arranged? The first recognizable feature of dreams is the inconstancy of things that appear in them: they are not so invariable and their boundaries not so sharp as are the objects of waking substantiative thought. It is typical of dreams that the things in them (including persons) are not substances - that is, they are insubstantial, and often lack the fixity associated with what we contemplate and experience in waking life. The particular singular entity in a dream does not include the *principle* of oneness; and though it may have a certain constancy, its bounds are more frangible than those of substance. Nothing ensures the constancy of things *beyond* their changes; yet things still have meaning. The singular entity in dreams is therefore *an ordered and meaningful gestaltic whole*.

The universal of substantiative thought is produced by ignoring the qualities that are peculiar to the singular entity. All the distinctive qualities of a singular entity can be removed from it without the entity disappearing, owing to the fixed and entirely abstract structure of the *substratum*. However, in oneiric thought the opposite is true, for it is impossible to remove all distinctive qualities of a singular entity and still retain something, because *nothing exists beyond the gestaltic qualities that constitute the singular entity*. Moreover in oneiric thought not only do the qualities constitute the singular entity, but they also determine the way in which singular entities are ordered and the kind of relations each has with the others. They are thus more tightly linked with one another and with the whole than are the qualities of the substance, and the boundaries between them and the whole are less sharp. Therefore if the parts (or gestaltic qualities) constitute the singular entity, then these parts also explain it. In other words, the singular entity is identified by one of its aspects - the aspect that is relevant to the situation. The gestaltic quality, by which the singular entity is identified is the „universal“ that explains everything and makes everything explicit. Hence gestaltic qualities are the *universals* of oneiric-mythic thought.

For the waking mind the same things may differ as to time and space and in some or all of their qualities, without disappearing or changing. Singular entities exist beyond their qualities as essences. For the oneiric mind, by contrast, singular entities cannot have an essence beyond their gestaltic, sense-perceived qualities. They are constant only within the limits of what is sense-perceived. Because of the absence of essence, or of an unalterable *substratum*, the same quality or aspect by which the singular is

identified constitutes their identity. Unlike substances, singular entities in non-substantiating thought are not what is not perceived. They are not what they were, not what they will be, not what they would be. In a word, they are not their essence.<sup>5</sup>

In substantiative thought a substance cannot be another substance, since its *substratum* is its principle of individuation, which is the principle of self-identity. In dreams, on the contrary, owing to the lack of substance, a thing may *also* be something else, either at the same time (what FREUD calls „condensation“) or by metamorphosis (cf. 1901, p. 279).

FREUD argues that condensation is intended to make dreams „brief, meagre and laconic“ (1901, p. 279). However, he contradicts himself by maintaining that condensation is a multiple *reproduction* of the same oneiric idea (cf. 1901, pp. 283-284). The term „condensation,“ then, is not appropriate for describing the process which it names. For the opposite of condensation — i. e., reproduction — cannot also be called subsumed under the term of „condensation.“ An alternative explanation to condensation is therefore called for.

Let us consider one of FREUD's own dreams which he himself put forward as an example of condensation. He reports the first part of his dream as follows:

„My friend R. was my uncle. — I had a great feeling of affection for him“ (1901, p. 137).

FREUD reports of the second part of the dream:

„I saw before me his face, somewhat changed. It was as though it had been drawn out lengthways. A yellow beard that surrounded it stood out especially clearly“ (1901, p. 137).

And then:

„My uncle did in fact have a face like that, elongated and framed in a handsome fair beard. My friend R. had originally been extremely dark; but ... black-haired people begin to turn gray [earlier] ... first they turn to a reddish brown, then to a yellowish brown ... My friend R.'s beard was at that time passing through this state“ (1901, pp. 138-139).

The condensed person in the dream is a composite of FREUD's friend R. and FREUD's uncle. Let us analyze in our terms, therefore how this composite persona is condensed. In the first part of the dream „my uncle“ is said *about* FREUD's friend. That is, „my uncle“ characterizes R. The second part of the dream reinforces this impression. The face that appears on this part continues to be the friend's face, for although it has acquired some of the qualities of the uncle's face, it is not substituted by the latter but only changes. Therefore „my uncle“ in the first part of the dream, and the yellow beard and elongated face in the second part are *explanans* of the friend.

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<sup>5</sup> See also CASSIRER (1957, II, 63-64).

The condensation is thus an explanation. FREUD's interpretation of the dream supports this conclusion: what characterizes this uncle in FREUD's memory is foolishness, so that what the dream is saying is that R. is a fool or a simpleton.<sup>6</sup> The uncle in the dream functions as a gestaltic-quality referring to the friend - he is an *explanans* of the friend.

How is it possible for one person (the uncle) to be an aspect or a quality of another (the friend)? The uncle in this dream is expressive of foolishness. He is the gestaltic personification of foolishness. In the second part of the dream the notion foolishness is expressed by gestaltic qualities of the uncle's face which have been transferred to the face of the friend. Since the singular entity in oneiric thought is identical with the gestaltic quality that explains it, the entity can also represent - or rather *express* - this aspect. Therefore any thing can function as an aspect of any other thing.

The structure of the oneiric form of thinking as described above also explains other procedures which are typical of dreams, and of which a number have a bearing on our concerns here:

*Inconstancy of subject.* In dreams even the subject is less stable than in waking thought. In some dreams the dreamer both acts and simultaneously looks at himself. At other times, the dreamer appears twice in different ways. Someone told us of a dream in which he was walking and met himself on the way. Within the framework of oneiric thought the subject and the object are not substances - they do not include a constant element beyond changes.

*Oneiric symbols as metaphors.* What FREUD called „symbol“ is generally closer to what we ordinarily call „metaphor.“ It is the expression of a thing or a situation by means of a similar thing or situation. The dream of our friend, who dreamed of her legs being cut off furnishes an example of such „metaphors“:

My legs were cut off because I had no visa to enter the US. Thin sticks replaced my legs. I could walk with them, but I had to learn how.

At the time the dream occurred, the dreamer had been spending her vacation in Israel, and awaiting the arrival of a document by mail which she needed in order to renew her visa. We asked her if she could furnish us with an immediate, spontaneous meaning of the dream. It was only two days later that she was finally able to „recall“ the meaning. It would appear that she used to consult a friend in the US about clothes (or rather „working clothes“) which would be suitable to be worn at job interviews. The last time

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<sup>6</sup> According to FREUD's interpretation, he had regarded his friend R. as being a simpleton so as to find a reason for his friend not receiving the rank of professor. This was so because, in his waking mind, FREUD knew that his friend was not promoted because he was a Jew, and he suspected that the same would happen to himself. His friend's „foolishness“ thus opens the doors to his own promotion.

she had asked, her friend suggested that she should fit herself out with high-heeled shoes. She tried on such a pair of shoes at the shoe store, but they were very uncomfortable and the way she walked in them seemed to her ridiculous. Thus according to her the amputated legs in the dream and the thin sticks that replaced them were the high-heeled shoes which in the end she did not buy. Once the dreamer had interpreted the dream this way, we asked her if the feeling she experienced in the dream corresponded with the feeling of having one's legs amputated, or with that of being shod in high-heels. She said she felt the second way.

Thus by metaphoric means the dream presented to the dreamer what was relevant to her waking life. The amputated legs with the narrow sticks did not merely stand for the high-heeled shoes of her waking experience, but encapsulated a whole situation (inclusive of the feeling and the context) from a perspective which is not salient during wakefulness. The high-heeled shoes are the punishment inflicted by the dreamer on herself for neglecting her duties.

*Dependence of time on events.* Dreaming-time is not like waking-time. Time to the dreamer while dreaming is similar to that of plays, movies, stories and poems. Events are grasped in dreams as taking their own time, which is often quite long - much longer than the time that dreams take, as measured by the clock. Often „empty“ periods are skipped, whereas time slows or stops to dwell on details that do not take much clock-time. Time in dreams is not a container of events, divided into equal periods and independently of occurrences. Rather, time in dreams is inherent to events; it is a quality of events. Proximity in time is also an *explanans*: events are also characterized by the time they take and by their temporal relations.

### **Archetypal Stereotypic Thought**

Having presented the general framework of oneiric and mythic thinking, we can now turn to an analysis of JUNG's comparison between dreams and myths. The archetypal way of thinking that JUNG ascribes to myths and dreams has much in common with the oneiric way of thinking. All the qualities of oneiric thought that derive from the absence of substance are also valid for archetypal thinking.

JUNG recognizes that the form of thought in dreams differs from everyday thinking (1948b, p. 237). He recognizes, too, that this form „is also a characteristic of primitive languages,“ and that the „language of dreams is a survival from an archaic mode of thought“ (1948b, p. 248). However JUNG does not base his comparison between dreams and myths on their respective forms of thought, but on certain varieties of *contents* which are common to them. Dreams, he observes, „contain symbolical images which we also come across in the mental history of mankind“ (1948a, p. 290). The



community of content, of archetypes, between myths and dreams leads JUNG to assume that these archetypes are given to people as products inherited from their human nature.<sup>7</sup>

Translated into our terms, an archetype is a universal *explanans*, in the way that genera are *explanans* in substantiative thought and qualities are the *explanans* in oneiric thought. The singular entity in archetypal thought is a stereotype, just as the singular entity is a substance for substantiative thought and is an ordered whole for oneiric-mythic thought.<sup>8</sup>

Archetypes are abstractions arranged as *ideal prominent singular entities* made of a permanent unity of certain qualities. An archetype is more than just a quality and less than a genus. It is already a single perspective of the singular entity, as in oneiric thought; but not yet a fixed and indestructible substratum that ensures permanency beyond change, as in substantiative thought.

Insofar as the singular entity is not the archetype, it is not recognizable. In archetypal thought the singular entity is nothing but the archetype. Thus an archetype subordinates a singular entity by way of *adaptation*. Archetypes subordinate the singular entity by adjusting some of its qualities to them, and by the annulment of those qualities that are not adjustable. The result is a „made-to-measure“ entity, namely a *stereotype*. For example, to be a mother it is enough to be adapted to the archetype of mother. The adapted mother is now an ideal mother, who has all the qualities belonging to this archetype, and is „freed“ from qualities that are not adjustable.

The peculiarity of the archetypal way of thinking can thus be summarized, by contrasting it with qualities and the substantiative forms of thought:

1. The universality of the archetype, *unlike that of the genus*, is not achieved by eliminating all peculiar qualities, but by emphasizing some of the qualities of the singular entity and eliminating the others.
2. Archetypes, unlike qualities as universals (as in oneiric thought), are not aspects of the singular entity. They are rather some aspects which, when they are brought together, constitute an individual-like structure.
3. The permanence of individual stereotypes, *unlike that of substances*, is not based on a principle of permanency (i. e., abstract *substrata*), but on a fixed combination of qualities.

<sup>7</sup> JUNG recognized that he failed to find clear evidence for his contention that archetypes are inherited images (1928, 188). Indeed, if „collective images“ are heritable, why are not individual memories heritable as well?

<sup>8</sup> The distinction here between the archetypal and substantiative forms of thought can help us to understand the difference between the philosophies of PLATO and ARISTOTLE. PLATO is archetypally-oriented, whereas ARISTOTLE is substantiatively-oriented. JUNG himself acknowledged his debt to PLATO, describing the PLATONic ideas as archetypes. Thus JUNG observes that PLATONic ideas are „'paradigms' or models, while real things are held to be only the copies of these model ideas“ (JUNG, 1919, 135).

4. The stereotype, *unlike an arranged whole*, is totally identical with its universal, the archetype.

### A Critique of JUNG's Theory of Archetypes

According to JUNG, not every dream includes archetypes. Archetypes are not included in what he calls „little“ dreams, which are „nightly fragments of fantasy coming from the subjective and personal sphere“ (1948a, p. 290). He finds archetypes only in „big“ dreams, which are „mythological motifs or mythologems“ (1948a, p. 291). JUNG asserts that also primitive peoples distinguish between „little“ and „big“ dreams (cf. 1948a, p. 290). However the fact that both JUNG and primitive cultures distinguish between „big“ and „little“ dreams, and that in both cases this distinction is based on the same criterion, is not evidence for the existence of „big“ or „little“ dreams. It only reinforces the contention being put forward here that the form of thought around which this part of JUNG's theory is ordered is close to the primitive form of thought.

JUNG's intention is to convince us that he did not so much find archetypes in dreams as only *recognized* them. If so, the contents that JUNG did as it were „find“ in dreams were adapted to archetypes known beforehand. This is not to say that JUNG distorted the facts so as to adapt them to his theory. However, since archetypes are part of his theory, and since the way in which archetypes subordinate individuals is the way of adaptation, it is inherent to JUNG's theory that singular entities should be related to the archetypal universals by means of adaptation.

Adaptation implies that the adapted entity is defective. Thus from the archetypal point of view *all singular entities are defective*, unless they are adapted. This is contrary to the case of genera and species, in regard to which *only exceptions* are defective.<sup>9</sup>

We may ask therefore why JUNG did not find as well archetypes in the ordinary waking thought of the sane. JUNG's answer is that archetypes are more distilled in dreams than in waking thought. According to JUNG, dreams and myths are indeed revelations of the unconscious, and it is only in the unconscious that archetypes are differentiated from the object (cf. 1948b, p. 275). Whereas in the conscious mind, the archetypes are on the contrary projected on to the object, and so cannot be easily recognized.

JUNG's reply in this regard is untenable, because dreams are in fact conscious rather than unconscious phenomena. Neither FREUD nor JUNG seem to have realized that dreams are consciously apprehended during dreaming. Moreover the very dreams which serve as the basis of their

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<sup>9</sup> ARISTOTLE, *Physics*, 199b.

theories are conscious in waking thought as well, since forgotten dreams cannot have furnished the empirical basis of any theory. Archetypes are therefore not distilled in dreams as a consequence of their being unconscious phenomena. And if dreams are conscious, then all the more so are myths conscious. Thus we would contend, as opposed to JUNG, that archetypes are distilled in dreams in particular simply because in oneiric thought there is nothing, like in gestalt perception, that disengages the images of an object from the object itself. In oneiric thought, as we have already seen, there are no fixed objects - no fixed substances that do not change when some quality is ascribed to them. The object in dreams is not totally separated from what is ascribed to it. Therefore nothing can be projected onto the object. Once anything - archetypes included - is ascribed to the object, it becomes to a degree identical with what is ascribed to it.

Archetypal thinking, as already noted, though different from the oneiric form of thought, is closely related to it. Indeed this is the very reason that JUNG adapted content appearing in dreams to contents known to him beforehand from alchemy, astrology, myths, and so on. Thus of „big dreams“ he asserts:

„They employ numerous mythological motifs that characterize the life of the hero. . . . We meet dragons, helpful animals, and demons; also the Wise Old Man, the animal-man, the wishing tree, the hidden treasure, the well, the cave, the walled garden, the transformative processes and substances of alchemy, and so forth“ (1948a, p. 293).

JUNG therefore adapts the contents of a *part* of dreams to archetypes, since he uses archetypes as an analytic device, and for this reason he is unable to get beyond those „numerous mythological motifs.“ They are, according to JUNG, unconscious. Not only dreams are manifestations of unconsciousness, but so is primitive psyche, which according to him is „essentially collective and therefore for the most part unconscious“ (1928, p. 147).

According to JUNG, the origin of archetypes is not the individual's unconsciousness, which contrary to the case of archetypes, may become conscious (cf. 1928, p. 154); rather it is a collective unconscious. And this collective unconscious is objective:

„We are dealing with a collective emotion, a typical situation full of affect, which is not primarily a personal experience but becomes one only secondarily. Primarily it is a universally human problem which, because it has been overlooked subjectively, forces itself objectively upon the dreamer's consciousness“ (1948a, p. 292).

„Objective“ for JUNG means independent of will (1948a, p. 128). „Objective“ contents are preserved by way of heredity. JUNG himself, however, has some reservations about the heritability of archetypes (cf. 1928, p. 188). The possibility of them being so is grounded on the assumption that archetypes are „inherited categories“ (cf. 1928, p. 135) and

„specific forms“ (cf. 1948a, p. 291). Archetypes are according to him „primordial images ... restored to life by the primitive, analogical mode of thinking. ...It is not a question of inherited ideas, but of inherited thought-patterns“ (1928, p. 135).

But even were we to agree with JUNG that forms are heritable, we should nevertheless contend that archetypes, at least as he describes them, are not forms but are contents. Whenever JUNG describes archetypes in detail, he evidently refers only to contents and not to forms:

„The form of the world into which ... [a person] is born is already inborn in him as a virtual image. Likewise parents, wife, children, birth, and death are inborn in him as virtual images .... These *a priori* categories have by nature a collective character .... We must therefore think of these images as lacking in solid content .... They only acquire solidity, influence, and eventual consciousness in the encounter with empirical facts....“ (1928, p. 188).

What JUNG describes as „*a priori* categories“ and as „images .... lacking in solid content,“ are specific contents; they are *products* of what we have called „archetypal forms.“ JUNG, therefore, does not fulfill his own requirement. He does not analyze „forms“ but „certain definite mythological images or motifs.“ Archetypes, as contents and not as forms, obviously cannot be heritable.

JUNG fails to derive forms from his comparison, for the reason that the comparison is based on mistaken categories: the *contents* (i. e., the archetypes) are being compared also as *form* (the criterion for the comparison). A comparison whose criterion is the contents which are to be compared can only produce the same contents. And since JUNG is unaware of the limits of his comparison, he shows a similarity only between contents. He has thus fallen into the error of *petitio principii*, in believing that he has an explanation of similarity based on the similarity itself.

At first glance JUNG's explanation of the similarity would seem to be extrinsic to the similarity, and to derive from the *collective and inherited* contents. However, this is a tautological explanation. The proof that the archetypes are collective is that they are common to societies and individuals unrelated to each other, and the proof that they are inherited is also that they are common. The commonness of content, by contrast, suggests the possibility of similarity between forms of thought. As we have tried to show, it is reasonable to assume that in the similar and even identical contents may often appear within the same form.

### Summary

We will try to penetrate to the root of archetypal thinking by undertaking a critique of JUNG's theory. In doing so, we will contend that the archetypal form of thought consists of universals that are ideal individuals (archetypes), and of individuals adapted to these universals by being made to their measure (the *stereotypes*). We will demonstrate, as well,

that this kind of thought is a later development of mythical thought. Finally, we will contend that the analysis of archetypes throws light on a more intricate question: namely, that of the function of this kind of thought in modern everyday waking thought.

### **Zusammenfassung**

Wir werden versuchen, die Wurzeln archetypischen Denkens zu ergründen, indem wir eine Kritik an JUNG's Theorie vornehmen. Hierbei werden wir behaupten, daß die archetypische Form von Gedanken aus Universalien besteht, die ideale Individuen darstellen, und aus Individuen besteht, die an diese Universalien mittels Stereotypisierung adaptiert sind. Wir werden weiterhin zeigen, daß diese Art des Denkens eine späte Entwicklung mythischen Denkens darstellt. Schließlich werden wir behaupten, daß durch die Analyse von Archetypen Licht auf eine kompliziertere Frage geworfen wird: die Frage nach der Funktion dieser Art des Denkens für die heutigen Alltagsgedanken des Wachbewußtseins.

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