MAURICE MANDELBAUM AS A GESTALT PHILOSOPHER*

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> "For [KÖHLER] science has not been a game, a livelihood, or a technique, but an essential means of satisfying men's intellectual needs. Such needs, he has seen, are not the needs of the scientist alone, nor are they disguised expressions of senseless and irrational forces; rather, he has taught us to see that the principles underlying human intellectual activity may be regarded not as isolated phenomena, divorced from feeling and from action, but as principles that are present throughout nature, and that therefore lie at the very center of man" (p. 62).
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> Maurice MANDELBAUM, "The Self-Excepting Fallacy," 1962

Maurice MANDELBAUM died in 1987, the "dean of philosopher's of history" (MINK, 1978; c.f. DUGGAN, 1987). He had written on other topics in his long career, of course, but he was best known for his early book, soon a classic, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (1938) and his mature statement of his views in *The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge* (1977). A posthumous book, *Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory* (1987) reiterated many of his principles in the philosophy of social science more generally. In the half century between 1938 and 1987 he published countless articles on the philosophy of history and, to a lesser extent, the philosophy of social science.

Does this exhaust MANDELBAUM's achievement? It is easy to overlook a philosopher's books and articles on topics outside of their central interest as the personal working out of a point of view, perhaps for the expediency of teaching. This might explain MANDELBAUM's *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience* (1955/1969) and *Philosophy, Science, and Sense-Perception* (1964). However, I

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wish to point out that there is a deeper unity to MANDELBAUM's views. This unity can only be brought out in the term "gestalt philosophy."

The idea that MANDELBAUM's philosophy can be reduced to gestalt theory is very exciting, because gestalt thinking has precisely lacked a philosophical voice for decades. When Mary HENLE edited *Documents of Gestalt Psychology* in 1961, she included three programmatic essays at the beginning by Max Wertheimer. Each had been previously published in the 'thirties and were thus over twenty five years old. While they are compelling articles, on truth, freedom, and ethics, respectively, WERTHEIMER is of all the original gestaltists the most cryptic and inimitable. They served as a token "philosophical" introduction to the gestalt theory, but at the same time alienated gestalt psychology from a continuing philosophical defense.

In Germany, the second generation gestalt psychologist, Wolfgang Metzger, included a philosophical chapter on epistemology by Norbert BISCHOF in the *Handbuch der Psychologie* (1966). English-speaking gestalt psychology needed such a similar work. It is not too strong to state that gestalt psychology consequently suffered from the lack of visibility of a clear defense of its empirical basis. In the scientistic tenor of the time, it was regarded as a fuzzy, continental import from Europe. It is into this context that we should greet MANDELBAUM, and it is just in time. Today Graz psychologists like Vittorio BENUSSI are receiving philosophical interest. Barry SMITH (1994) has remarked that "the proponents of the Berlin school lacked a wider philosophical framework of the sort that had been for the Graz psychologists by Meinong and by Brentano" (p. 69). No one would have been more qualified to dispell this notion than MANDELBAUM.

It is understandable that, apart from dedications and acknowledgments to KÖHLER, MANDELBAUM never called his approach "gestalt-inspired." Not only would it have sacrificed his autonomy, but the elaborations he provided for admittedly good leads were extremely sophisticated and went well beyond what had existed previously in gestalt writing. Nevertheless, it is no accident that when we read one of MANDELBAUM's contemporaries like Richard BRANDT providing a thumbnail sketch of a book like *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience*, it is said to be influenced by gestalt psychology. What MANDELBAUM's contemporaries took for granted we should as well. Especially as time passes, the body of his work risks marginalization. Something that can help us see the unity in it will also maintain its relevance in the future.

"Gestalt" obviously derives from the school of psychology. Around 1910, Max Wertheimer executed some experiments in Friedrich SCHUMANN's laboratory in Frankfurt, which came to be his "Studies of Seeing Motion" of 1912. This was the foundational work of gestalt psychology which WERTHEIMER began to construct along with two younger contemporaries, Kurt KOFFKA (188-1941) and Wolfgang KÖHLER (1887-1967). The main point they introduced was that the sensory core was a myth and that percepts were the products of autonomous functioning of the nervous system.

However, the position came to have not only psychological, but philosophical implications as well. In the nineteen-teens, we should recall, German psychology was still closely related to philosophy. As docents and then as Professors WERTHEIMER, KOFFKA and KÖHLER all had responsibilities to teach philosophy in addition to psychology. The intellectual historian Mitchell ASH (1995) records that WERTHEIMER taught the "Theory of Knowledge" and "The Origins of Philosophy," while KÖHLER taught the "History of Nineteenth Century Philosophy," "Contemporary Philosophy," "The Philosophy of Bergson," and "The Physical Basis of Consciousness."

It is clear, then, that the gestalt psychologists had to be proficient in their philosophy. It is only in this context that we can understand that KÖHLER went on in 1922 to receive the most prestigious chair in philosophy in Germany when he succeeded Carl STUMPF at the University of Berlin, and WERTHEIMER -- of whom many have not heard -- won his professorship in Frankfurt over Martin HEIDEGGER, Karl JASPERS and Max SCHELER (LUCHINS and LUCHINS, 1986). WERTHEIMER, in fact, went on to specialize in logic and truth, teaching a famous joint seminar on truth with Paul TILLICH and Kurt RIEZLER.

Gestalt psychology, because of its emphasis on the act of perceiving, is naturally most readily applicable to epistemology. But that is not the only thing that the gestaltists concerned themselves with. For one thing, the gestalt concept, itself, is ontological. Furthermore, all of the gestalt theorists concerned themselves with problems of ethics and even aesthetics.

Perhaps the most unified philosophical statement written by a gestalt theorist was KÖHLER's *The Place of Value in a World of Facts* (1938). The book began as the William James lectures of 1935; KÖHLER had come to Harvard to deliver the lectures, shortly before resigning his post at the University of Berlin because of pressure from Nazi authorities. The book deals quite a bit with mind-body issues (neurophysiology) but its emphases are defending a form of critical realism and an ethical objectivism.

The critical realism is defended against the challenges of New Realism, and especially the writings of KÖHLER's friend Ralph Barton PERRY. KÖHLER defended EDDINGTON's (1929) "two tables" and criticized Naive Realism by appealing to a "two language" view of everyday and scientific entities. Perry was a convenient foil for ethics as well. Against PERRY's subjective definition of value as interest, KÖHLER insisted on value as a reflexive demand ("requiredness"); he even went so far as to state that the relation of the phenomenal ego and object had neurophysiological counterparts which exhibited "requiredness" in the perceiver's nervous system.

It is here that MANDELBAUM enters the picture. As a doctoral student of Marshall Urban at Yale, MANDELBAUM undertook doctoral research in Germany. His dissertation became *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* and thus treated of numerous German philosophers of history (DILTHEY, RICKERT, SCHELER). He studied at the University of Berlin, and it is here that he first met KÖHLER and his

students. We know that MANDELBAUM was well tuned in to happenings at Berlin because he picked up the concept of "scale" and "facet" from an obscure dissertation by Kajic MILANOV (overseen by KÖHLER) that ended up in his first book. He must have been aware of KÖHLER's and Kurt LEWIN's relations to the Society for Empirical Philosophy and their responses to the logical empiricist's movement.

More importantly, however, MANDELBAUM obtained his first teaching position at the same college to which KÖHLER had fled from Nazi Germany: Swarthmore College. KÖHLER was to remain at Swarthmore until his retirement in 1958, thus, MANDELBAUM was from 1934 to 1947 (when he left) in close contact with the elder psychologist. As early as 1940 in fact KÖHLER cites his appreciation to MANDELBAUM for editorial help in the preface to his *Dynamics in Psychology*, the Page-Barbour lectures given at the University of Virginia by KÖHLER in 1938.

During this time, MANDELBAUM's primary interest had shifted to ethics. Not only was KÖHLER at Swarthmore, but the brilliant Gestalt theorist Karl DUNCKER (1903-1941) who took his life in America during the escalation of the second world war. The phenomenologist Herbert SPIEGELBERG has remarked of DUNCKER's rich philosophical background and it is undoubtedly true that had he lived, he might have developed extremely interesting ideas; he was the true "heir apparent" of gestalt philosophizing. MANDELBAUM discussed ethics with both. In an address from the years during the war (1942-5), KÖHLER (1971) hints at MANDELBAUM in a discussion of value when he says that "My friends among the philosophers tell me that nothing can help but an analysis of moral judgments on their own ground, a purely phenomenological analysis. . .I am anxiously waiting for the outcome of that analysis" (p. 344).

This analysis of course became MANDELBAUM's *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience* (1955). The book bears a dedication to KÖHLER, and acknowledges Duncker in the preface. The book accepts the gestalt position of value as reflexive demand, but goes much further beyond it by offering a critique of utilitarianism, distinguishing between direct and removed moral judgments, as well as providing a section on the sources and resolution of moral controversies. Unfortunately, the book has not received much interest either from phenomenologists nor did it come up during the recent debates, sparked by J. L. MACKIE (1977) on the phenomenological incorrigibility, yet subjectivity, of value.

MANDELBAUM next went to Dartmouth College (1947-1957) and then Johns Hopkins (1957-1978) where he spent the longest period of his career. He soon turned his attention to the theory of knowledge. He approached it, however, both historically and critically, hence the title of his next book *History, Science and Sense-Perception: Historical and Critical Essays* (1964).[1] Unhappy with interpreta-

[1] In the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, there is deposited a letter dated 12 October 1964 from Maurice MANDELBAUM in Baltimore to Wolfgang KÖHLER, then in Berlin as a guest of the Freie Universität. MANDELBAUM refers to an earlier letter from KÖHLER in which the latter had praised MANDELBAUM's recent *History, Science, and Sense-Perception* (1964). MANDELBAUM

tions of Locke and the problems of representationalism and the meaning of terms like "primary" and "secondary" quality, MANDELBAUM undertook a study of Boyle and Newton, the sources of Locke's approach, and charted how these ideas were distorted by Berkeley. Then, he offered a critique of Hume's scepticism based on the argument of the prior dependence of doubt upon belief. This was the working of MANDELBAUM's "self-excepting" fallacy, or the attempt to justify doubt which is, however, always "parasitic" upon prior belief.

In the last chapter, "Toward a Radical Critical Realism," MANDELBAUM in a way picked up the thread where KÖHLER had left it and qualified KÖHLER's critical realism -- which merely stated that we have no right to identify sensed qualities with the qualities of actual objects -- and strengthened the claim to a *radical* critical realism, in his words, we have no right to identify any sensed qualities with objects themselves. He also picked up from KÖHLER's critique of PERRY and the New Realism and added a critique of its successor in RYLE's naive realism. MANDELBAUM reaffirmed the necessity to address non-conceptual problems like the causal chain and sensory processes, problems at the center of debate today. In the appendix to the book, MANDELBAUM expresses a special debt to KÖHLER's epistemology and remarked how he would have followed it further, if his intention was to write an actual epistemology.

MANDELBAUM wrote on numerous topics throughout his career. I have suggested that a key to understanding their unity is to look to a common background in gestalt theory. MANDELBAUM's epistemology and ethics, it seems clear enough, have precedents in gestalt theories. But his metaphysics do too, as the discussion of determinism suggested. At this point I want to sketch the three major categories of philosophical thought -- metaphysics, epistemology and ethics -- and the tasks that lie ahead for a gestalt philosophy that recognizes MANDELBAUM as its most recent major upholder.

Metaphysics

Gestalt, itself, is of course a metaphysical category, proposed by Christian von EHRENFELS in 1890 to refer to a non-extended part that survived certain transformations of its foundations, just as a melody survives transposition (EHRENFELS, 1890/1988). As we have seen, MANDELBAUM has written least on ontology, although he has much to say about metaphysics. Nevertheless, his work can be related to the gestalt approach.

There has been a revival of gestalt ontology, especially by "Austrian" philosophers like Barry SMITH. They give a great deal of credit to KÖHLER's *Die physischen Gestalten* as well as Wertheimer's discussion of the part-as-part. They tend,

wrote "I have had some pleasant responses. However, yours was best of all." The original letter from KÖHLER may be in MANDELBAUM's file at the American Philosophical Association in Delaware, although I have not checked yet.

however, to see these as supplements and, sometimes, misunderstanding of the more complete thought of Edmund HUSSERL or Roman INGARDEN. In this context, how seriously can we take Aron GURWITSCH's (1958) claim that KÖHLER's ontology surpassed HUSSERL's? Gestalt ontology was precisely interesting for its relation to natural science, and we see that a gestalt ontology today would be less close to the dependence-independence paradigm of Austrian (and ultimately Aristotelian) philosophizing than to catastrophe theory, synergetics and chaos theory.

MANDELBAUM probably accepted KÖHLER's and WERTHERIMER's main ideas. There are hints of the influence of gestalt ideas in different places, as when MANDELBAUM deals with *temporal* gestalten (1948) and the problem of emergence (1951). It is a pity, however, that he never addressed the important work of Edwin RAUSCH (1966). We can only wonder what he might have thought of RAUSCH's concession to both gestalt-as-whole and gestalt-as-quality.

MANDELBAUM's most important metaphysical contribution has been to social ontology (1955/1984). LEWIN's discussions of the individual-group relation were promising but ultimately disappointing, regarding the group as some aggregate with emergent properties. In distinction, in the 1950s MANDELBAUM argued that "societal facts," not groups, have emergent properties not reducible to their parts. MANDELBAUM's theory of "methodological institutionalism" is enjoying a great deal of popularity, especially its defense in present day "Critical Realism" (c.f., LLOYD, 1986, pp. 141-178). This should be of special interest to LEWINians and group dynamics specialists who operate in the netherland between the psychological and social sciences.

The exciting thing about Critical Realism is the way in which it is concerned with social structure and agency. Here, practitioners should take special notion of MANDELBAUM's corrections for the ideas of causality and moral responsibility. In 1960 he published an extremely important paper, "Determinism and Moral Responsibility," which can also be linked to KÖHLER. Gestalt theorists had long been unhappy with the Humean notion of causality as a linear chain. DUNCKER, Albert MICHOTTE, and Solomon ASCH had all insisted that we perceive causality as a single process, and this suggested the metaphysical idea that causality is a non-linear, contemporaneous process. MANDELBAUM would later expand this idea greatly in *The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge* (1977), but its nascent implications for ethics struck him already.

How can we be caused to act and yet be held morally responsibility for our action? MANDELBAUM reasoned that since causality (and, hence, the causes of our behavior) is not linear, contemporaneous causation or what LEWIN had called "behavior as a function of the whole situation," determined behavior. While an unfamiliar form of determinism, it was nevertheless determinism. MANDELBAUM's earlier analysis had determined that the environment causes us to act upon its reflexive demands. Thus, we are determined to react upon external demands, and for this we may be held morally responsible. He later clarified how we sometimes,

through diverted attention, choose the wrong things, but we may still be held responsible for these determined choices. Obviously, these ideas are extremely important for ethics as well.

Epistemology

As mentioned before, gestalt epistemology is critical realist, neither accepting naive realism nor scepticism or idealism. Further, it is an unusual mix of phenomenalism and physicalism, united through the concept of isomorphism (EPSTEIN & HATFIELD, 1994). When MANDELBAUM began working, he had both the theoretical as well as the empirical work of KÖHLER to draw upon. KÖHLER had argued for the "two worlds," after EDDINGTON, to take account of both phenomenal percepts and transcendent objects. MANDELBAUM surely recognized the unique gestalt ability to unite the two through isomorphism.

According to the critical realism defended by MANDELBAUM in *History, Science and Sense-Perception* our very acts of perceiving are causal and when we see a stick bend in the water, we take it into account and therefore our perceiving cannot be separated from our acts. This means that there is no realm of pure perceiving as certain realists have argued. This also means that natural science and especially the causal process which goes into seeing, for example, is important for our understanding of the structure of knowledge. For years MANDELBAUM's was a lone voice in the philosophical world. Most philosophers were enamored by Vienna School positivist phenomenalism or Ordinary Language philosophy. But MANDELBAUM held fast that an ontologically based (and not inferential) theory of perceiving is necessary.

MANDELBAUM worked on many individual epistemological problems. Relating to the causal theory of perceiving, MANDELBAUM clarified how the causal chain does argue against naive realism but does not imply subjectivism. He also usefully distinguished between different kinds of relativism - conceptual, subjective, and objective (MANDELBAUM, 1980/1984) and challenged attempts to subsume all perceiving to frameworks of understanding, in the manner of Thomas KUHN. MANDELBAUM's critical realism has explicitly been extended by the theorist Christopher LLOYD, who has engaged the eminent philosopher's contribution (LLOYD, 1986, 1993). LLOYD's theory is close to the Critical Realism of Roy BHASKAR that upholds an ontologically based model of perceiving and understanding the world based on real transcendent structures.

MANDELBAUM also carried on gestalt psychologists' attempts to define the phenomenally given (KÖHLER, DUNCKER), and distinguish between subjectivity and objectivity. He specified characteristics of the phenomenal world, drawing upon MICHOTTE, to define criterion of definiteness and criterion of coherence in the world and argued against solipsism because the means to judge the veracity of

reality are in perception itself. These qualities, to return to RAUSCH, could be portrayed as "prägnanz-aspects."

Toward the end of his career, MANDELBAUM was content to utilize old aspects of gestalt psychology. He does not seem to have been aware of more recent work. But the addition of contemporary gestalt psychology can only bolster his position and also suggest further clarifications. His critical realism frustrates both realists and constructivists who happen in this instance to be those who follow the hopeful starts of J. J. GIBSON and those who adhere to the inferential theories of HELMHOLTZ. In reading many of William EPSTEIN's (1988, 1993) reviews of contemporary perceptual theory MANDELBAUM would have found much to agree with.

At the same time MANDELBAUM could utilize newer arguments regarding the mind-body relationship that might have been the cause of some defensiveness. Synergetic approaches to the mind-body problem (STADLER & KRUSE, 1990) and, in the least, connectionism, spell out a non-humoncular and naturalistic theory that can do justice to the complexity of human perceiving and thought.

Ethics

As mentioned before, MANDELBAUM's efforts in ethics grew directly out of his association with KÖHLER and DUNCKER. MANDELBAUM's important *Phenomenology of Moral Experience* (1955/1969) is in a real sense a rigid restatement of gestalt principles. Like KÖHLER, MANDELBAUM begins his inquiry into value with phenomenology. He tries to exhaust the phenomenology of value before going on to different rule systems of justice and the like.

The gestalt theorists like WERTHEIMER (1935) and KÖHLER (1938) argued that there is a "requiredness" between some state of affairs and some intended action. "Requiredness" implies that we are impelled toward the right action and is a strong form of objectivism. Here they are in close company with some realist phenomenologists (SCHELER, HARTMANN) who argue for failures of correct moral action in "moral blindness:" we did not perceive something as valuable because of (temporary) blindness. I am reminded of J. J. GIBSON refusing to explain perceiving without a moving subject. The invocation of "static," like "blindness" does nothing for the facts to be explained.

MANDELBAUM is an objectivist but is reasonable about its limitations. He prefers the word "fitting" rather than "required." But like the gestalt theorists instead of saying that value simply "is," he follows gestalt theory in trying to specify the conditions in which experiences of value arise. This lies precisely in the metaphysical properties of the world and its qualities. KÖHLER (1938) was the first to call value or "moral requiredness" a Gestalt quality. Perhaps MANDELBAUM would have agreed with Risieri FRONDIZI (1973) who has written that values "cannot be *separated* from the empirical qualities and yet neither can they be *reduced* to them" (p.

160). Ontologically speaking, this is because they are existentially dependent on empirical qualities, and yet emerge above them.

Already implicit in KÖHLER's discussion is the artificiality of teleological theories like utilitarianism. MANDELBAUM called his theory a perceptual form of deontological theory. As he argues, teleological theories have plausability when we "stand outside of ourselves" and make what he calls "removed moral judgements." However, the phenomenology of (especially) direct moral judgements finds no place for the calculation of ends, and this is as well because teleological theories are more concerned anyway with what "really" is right.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the teleological explanation of value is the simplicity with which it seeks to explain such a complex problem as moral striving. After all, teleological theories by their definition focus upon one idea at a time. For example, utilitarianism sees the good as the satisfaction of rational desire, hedonism sees the good as pleasure, eudamonism sees the good as happiness, perfectionism sees the good as self-fulfillment, etc. But, as MANDELBAUM (1987) asks, "why should we assume that there is some one factor which is adequate to explain why we seek those objects or experiences that we do?" (p. 163).

The tendency toward self-realization does not refer to the psychological fact that we all share concrete, practical ends toward which we strive, but rather an abstract, end *in itself*. The difficulty with this position is that although our individual actions serve our self-realization, in MANDELBAUM's (1971) words, "they are not to be explained as being engendered by a tendency toward that end" (p. 264). While self-realizationism was popular in nineteenth century thought, and especially its idealist manifestations, as WALLACH and WALLACH (1983) point out, twentieth century psychology has been simply dominated by self-realizationist doctrines. Neo-Freudians like Erich FROMM and Karen HORNEY, as well as post-Freudians like Carl ROGERS, Abraham MASLOW have nominated self-realization as the goal of ethical striving. WALLACH and WALLACH criticize such points of view by referring to the motivating force of the environment, itself. It is very unfortunate that the Wallachs did not engage their work with knowledge of MANDELBAUM's enterprise.

Moral judgments are "perceptual" and we should not confuse them with intellectual operations. It is here that DREYFUS and DREYFUS (1990) take MANDELBAUM to task for neglecting unwilled action, which they wish to elevate as the true subject matter of ethics. They chastise MANDELBAUM for his "intellectualist prejudice" of elevating judgments. But it seems that the Dreyfuses have confused the epistemology of resonsibility (what is "my" action) versus the objectivity of moral requiredness, which is assured in his system. MANDELBAUM (1955/1969), indeed, writes that "the term 'judgment' as here used must be construed in a loose manner, for in speaking of a direct moral judgment, I do not mean to imply that inference is involved" (p. 46). Direct moral judgments, for instance, are immediate in the sense that DREYFUS and DREYFUS intend. But they cannot be called actions for which someone else may be held responsible.

Recently, the "phenomenology of moral experience" has been frankly accepted by some philosophers who, nevertheless, argue for the non-objectivity of value (MACKIE, 1977). This makes some sense because the epistemological doctrine of phenomenalism insists on the immediacy of sensory percepts but denies their necessary correlation to the external world. But just as epistemological constructivism can be attacked, such ethical constructivism can be attacked as well. As MANDELBAUM might (1955/1969) retort, to "explain the apparent objectivity in genetic terms, is. . .invalid. The problem is then merely pushed back to the past, and the question of why [projection] operates in one case and not in another. . .becomes, if not insoluble, at least more difficult to handle" (pp. 315-6).

Here one will be reminded immediately of gestalt arguments relating to the problem of past experience in perceiving. Indeed, MANDELBAUM shows how gestalt structure can determine disparities of perception in the judgment of value (for example, the exchanging of part-whole relations). DUNCKER (1939) and ASCH (1952) already put forward important arguments to the effect that values are not absolute but determined relationally and that when a context is determined then a value follows from it. For example, a practice (part) such as infanticide can have a radically aspect when judged in different cultural contexts (whole). This does not deny the objectivity of value but points to its relational nature.

MANDELBAUM has added to this discussion with different kinds of moral disagreements. (1) actions are perceived from different perspectives, or (2) situations are perceived from different perspectives, (3) different perception of results and (4) the different perception of the range of results. MANDELBAUM also discusses the problem of the effects of emotion, sentiment and personality on judgments of moral goodness and worth, which can favorably be compared to work by gestalt psychologists on "New Look" psychology and the like (HENLE, 1955; PRENTICE, 1958).

Conclusion

Nobody is exactly sure how philosophically to defend gestalt theory. Attention has varied between Continental Phenomenology (late HUSSERL, MERLEAU-PONTY) and Austrian Realism (BRENTANO, MEINONG, BENUSSI, early HUSSERL), cutting a wide swath of alternatives. One can see the need for some resolution by reading the home-grown reconstructions sometimes offered. Donald CAMPBELL's (1989) discussion of the "moral epistemology" of Solomon ASCH, for example, has no shortage of philosophical categories but one feels at the same time a strange lack of recognition with the theorist described.

In the various philosophical fields there are promising affinities and leads. No one, however, represents in their philosophical output the (1) metaphysical "intelligible holism," (2) the phenomenally realist and critical realist epistemology and (3) moral objectivism that is gestalt theory except Maurice MANDELBAUM. This is

because he was critically influenced by his mentor KÖHLER but also because he himself responded to this world view in his own significant way. The fact that he did not advertise his gestalt membership should not make us hesitate in reaping the benefits of seeing greater coherence in his work and seeing a better philosophical defense of laboratory psychological work.

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