

**Karl Duncker**

**ON PLEASURE, EMOTION, AND STRIVING**

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**Editor's Preface**

At his untimely death, Dr. Karl Duncker of the department of psychology at Swarthmore College, left his manuscript, which he had intended to be a chapter of a book on motivation. In editing it, with a few minor exceptions, I have made only such changes as were necessary to clarify the English text; I have strictly retained the author's meaning. References were checked and added, wherever possible, either by myself or by Dr. Herbert Spiegelberg, who shares the responsibility for the changes.

Dr. Duncker is best known to American psychologists for his brilliant contribution to the psychology of thinking, *Zur Psychologie des produktiven Denkens* (Berlin, Julius Springer, 1935) and for other articles on the subject. His experiments on induced movement („Über induzierte Bewegung," *Psychologische Forschung*, vol. XII, 1929, pp. 180 ff.) are likewise well known. His article on „Ethical Relativity? (an Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics)" in *Mind*, vol. XLVIII (1939), pp. 39-57, presents a very acute criticism of the standard arguments of ethical relativism.

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**Introduction**

1. A search for the ultimate motives of human conduct cannot disregard pleasure which many eminent minds have considered to be the fundamental motive, or at least an important one. Others, to be sure, have held that pleasures is the outcome rather than the motive or goal of human striving. But both sides are agreed that there is *some* relationship between pleasure and striving.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that many human strivings bear some kind of reference to pleasure, and likewise that many pleasures bear some reference to striving. These references are both certain enough to exist, and obscure enough as to their nature, to present a genuine and inescapable problem.

Since the days of Aristippus, thinkers have wrangled over the issue of hedonism. The longevity of the problem bears witness to its importance as well as to its elusiveness. Like many another time-honored philosophical problem, the question of pleasure and striving seems to have been caught in a dilemma neither side of which is truly satisfactory. We shall have to recast the problem. We recognize its existence, but refuse to strangle it with ill-suited concepts. We propose first to learn the facts themselves by conducting a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of the statics and dynamics of pleasure.

While those who believe that we strive for pleasure go under a definite label, „hedonism," the other side which regards pleasure as a by-product of successful striving has no distinctive name. „Anti-hedonism" would be too broad a designation. One may challenge hedon-

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ism without, for that reason, pledging oneself to accept the reverse relationship between pleasure and striving. Many explanations of pleasure have been proposed that would be compatible with an anti-hedonistic position, and yet do not trace pleasure to successful striving. Metaphysical theories such as Spinoza's derivation of pleasure from a transition to greater perfection, physiological theories like those of Lehmann or Freud - in terms of neural metabolism or „excitation,“ psychological theories tracing pleasure to some sort of harmony (Herbart, Lipps), value-theories like Scheler's in which pleasure is regarded as a „sign“ of felt value, and, last but not least, those many biological theories ascribing pleasantness to what is beneficial to the organism - these and similar views do not hold the second alternative: that pleasure is a by-product of successful striving. Yet they are perfectly compatible with an anti-hedonistic position. Therefore, since anti-hedonism is not a precise name for the second alternative, I propose to call it *hormism*, following the lead of the latest of its greater representatives, W. McDougall.<sup>1</sup> Hormism, then, is the theory that pleasure occurs when a conation, i.e., some striving for an object or goal, is being successful, while displeasure occurs when a conation is being frustrated.

2. Like the majority of the great rivers of thought, both hedonism and hormism have springs in the gigantic mountain range of Aristotle's philosophy. One spring of hedonism is the book *De Anima*: „Desire is the craving for the pleasant“;<sup>2</sup> while those of hormism are in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: “Pleasure is the consummation of activity.”<sup>3</sup>

What is, to my mind, the keenest formulation of psychological hedonism in modern philosophy comes, strangely enough, from Kant. In the first part of his *Critique of Practical Reason*, where all natural strivings are *en masse*, given over to a strictly hedonistic interpretation in order that ethics may be saved from compromising with anything beyond pure duty, we read the following statement: „Just as to the man who wants money to spend, it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain or washed out of the sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the same value, so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas (which he en-

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<sup>1</sup> William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, London, 23<sup>rd</sup> ed., 1936, suppl. ch. 7.

McDougall would not admit that pleasure is a mere by-product. He states that „though it is not the initiator... and sole sustainer of striving,... pleasant feeling reinforces, sustains, supports the striving process which gives rise to it...“*The Energies of Men*, New York, 1933, p. 138.

However, in my opinion, the fact that he allows for a sustaining influence of pleasure (which he calls „Hedonism of the present,“ *Soc. Psych.* p. 456) renders his hormism less consistent as a theory to the same extent to which it renders it more adapted to the facts.

<sup>2</sup> *De An.* Book II, 3, 414, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Eth. Nich.* Book X, 4, 1174 § 23 ff.

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joys) are of the understanding or of the senses, but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the longest time."<sup>4</sup> Other clearly hedonistic statements are to be found in the works of Spinoza,<sup>5</sup> Hobbes, Helvetius, Bentham, Mill, Spencer, Lotze, Schmoller, Freud, and others.

The first elaborate formulation of modern hormism occurs in Bishop Butler's *Sermons of Human Nature*: „Every man hath ... a variety of particular affections, passions and appetites to particular external objects ... distinct from the pleasure arising from them ... Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions and affections“. Other hormistic statements are contained in the works of Stewart, Hume, Hamilton, Green, von Hartmann, Natorp, Scheler, McDougall, Allen, and others. We may conclude with a quotation from the most tenacious of all hormists, McDougall: „Pleasure and pain result from conation, are determined by the striving, pleasure, when the striving attains its natural goal, or progresses towards it; pain, when striving is thwarted or obstructed and fails to achieve, or progress toward, its goal.“<sup>6</sup>

I know of only a few men who have recognized that there are both cases which seem to call for a hedonistic interpretation and others which seem to be more in line with a hormistic theory. They are William James and G. F. Stout, and, less distinctly, Aristotle, Butler, and Scheler.

3. I doubt that anybody could let the issue of hedonism penetrate the surface of his mind without experiencing a genuine bewilderment, as though confronted with what the Greeks used to call an *aporia*, i.e., a case in which both of two seemingly contradictory statements appear to be true and false at the same time. For the purpose of his ultimate resolution I shall try to make this *aporia* as urgent as possible, giving the floor first to a hedonist for all he may have to say, and then to a hormist, and picking men as intelligent as I can find.

„Isn't it true,“ our hedonist would say, „that in desiring something we feel it would be pleasant to have it? We never seem to desire something that appears neutral or unpleasant throughout. There is in the very objective of desire a promise of pleasantness that makes all the difference.

„And don't we speak of a delightful evening or a pleasant trip as though the delightfulness, the pleasantness were the very thing that makes us dwell on it and seek it again? Why do we rate our pastimes in terms of delightfulness?

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<sup>4</sup> *Critique of Practical Reasons*, Part I § 3, note 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ethica*, Part III, proposition XXVIII ff.

<sup>6</sup> William McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, New York, 1923, p. 269.

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„And why do we often accept as a substitute for one pastime another that has nothing in common with it but pleasure, i.e., one that is derived from a totally different source? The other day I met a little girl crying sadly because she was not to go on a ride. She accepted my piece of candy and was happy again. She might have forgotten the ride, but we ourselves often behave similarly without forgetting.

„Moreover, what of those cases in which we literally ‘run into’ a pleasure we did not know to exist where we found it? Children, for instance, ‘discover’ all sorts of pleasure which they then hold on to or seek again. Surely the pleasure could not have been caused by the success of the very desire which the pleasure itself had initiated.

„Nor in many cases can the displeasure, at the beginning, and the pleasure at the end, of an activity be the outcome, respectively, of the frustration and fulfillment of one and the same conation. In hunger, for example, the displeasure of the pangs is both at a different place and of a different kind from the pleasure of tasting and swallowing. And if you feel relief after a man has stepped off your toe, you certainly do not feel the pleasure where you felt the pain. Therefore one and the same conation for food (or away from the pain) cannot be charged with being the cause of both ends of the affective experience.

„If, for the sake of variety, I may draw some arguments from language, why do the Germans in ninety per cent of all instances of desire use that telling expression: ‘ich habe Lust nach...’, literally: ‘I have pleasure to...,’ meaning exactly: ‘I desire...’?

„And why should a person who for some time has been in the depth of a depression be inclined to say: ‘Oh, there is nothing that gives me pleasure anymore’ (‘nichts macht mir mehr Freude’)?

„However“, the hedonist would continue, „I have not yet shot off my heaviest guns. How about this: If pleasure were no more than the outcome or by-product of something, why should we occasionally build up this something for no other reason than to enjoy the outcome? In short, how about the gourmet who cultivates his appetite in order to exploit it? Perverse or not, he exists. I know a boy who, on a cold night, would stick one of his legs out of bed, not because it was too warm inside, but because he so liked the feel of his cold leg getting warm again. That’s quite a lot for mere outcome to achieve, I would say.

„Or take the case of Bishop Butler’s man who would ‘go through some laborious work upon promise of a great reward without any distinct knowledge what the reward will be.’<sup>7</sup> Not knowing what is in store for him, he cannot properly be said to be prompted by any particular appetite, but only by a very general desire for ‘something

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<sup>7</sup> Sermon I, note 2

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nice.' Hence, the object being unknown, only its pleasantness remains to exert a motivating power. However,“ our hedonist would add - with that generosity only true self-assurance is capable of, though not without a shade of irony - „he might of course, subconsciously, be prompted by all the appetites he can muster at the time, somehow interpreting the unknown entity in terms of them. So let us go on.

„Suppose you are invited to a party with other people who are all good friends among themselves. You are the only newcomer, and, as it happens, not at your best. You make attempts to join the group, to be a part of it, but somehow you don't succeed. Gradually the situation becomes rather unpleasant for you. The natural way of getting out of this disagreeable situation would have been to succeed in your desire to join the party. But you don't succeed. And what do you do? You 'go out of the field,' as K. LEWIN would say;<sup>8</sup> You destroy the very desire to join in, in order to escape the displeasure of being left out. I don't deny, mind you, that, speaking in the language of the hormist, the unpleasantness was the outcome of the frustration of a desire. All I want to say now is that it is also the origin of another, and totally different, desire which aims at nothing but relief from the unpleasantness caused by the first one. Our present case is in a strict sense the opposite of that of the gourmet. The gourmet builds up an appetite in order to enjoy the pleasure from its satisfaction. In the present case it is a matter of destroying an appetite in order to escape the displeasure of its frustration. Well, to my mind, I have said enough. It is time for the hormist to speak.“

Let me use the time it will take our hormist to collect his thoughts to ask the listener to regard the ten points just made not merely as arguments for a theoretical position, but as so many aspects of the subject matter itself. I confess that I see a positive contribution in everyone of them, not exactly to hedonism, but to a new understanding of the facts themselves. Everyone of them is a stroke of the chisel in the process of throwing into relief some feature of the thing itself. I propose to listen to the hormist with the same attitude of mind. He is no fool either.

„Well“, the hormist begins, „even if it should be true that there are cases in which we strive for pleasure, it would surely be wrong to say that we always do. We do not smile for the pleasure of the smiling nor frown for the pleasure of the frown, as JAMES once put it.<sup>9</sup> Nor do we do these things in order to flee from displeasure. For no displeasure need be involved. True, it would soon become unpleasant if we stopped breathing, but we breathe without waiting for, or think-

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<sup>8</sup> Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, New York, 1935, ch. III, p. 90.

<sup>9</sup> William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, vol. II, p. 550.

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ing of, the stimulus of such unpleasantness. Thus a good deal of reflex, of habitual, and of expressive activity, at any rate, is not hedonic in however broad a sense.

„It is also evident that only a minor section of purposive activity can be said to be prompted by desires for pleasure or away from displeasure. The larger section is concerned with preparing for, and safeguarding, life as a whole or the means of subsistence. In other words, if an aim at all, pleasure could here come in only as a very indirect or ultimate aim, except for those immediate feelings of pleasure or displeasure that come from a sense of having done or failed to do ones duty - the (actual or anticipated) displeasure of not doing the right thing, and, in a smaller measure, the pleasure of doing the right thing - right and wrong being defined with reference to the individual's system of life.

„Furthermore, pleasure can never be the goal in abstraction from the objective side of a total experience. Pleasure is somehow bound up with this other side of the matter more closely than is any goal with its means. Accordingly, if the hedonist was right in claiming that the immediate objective of a desire always contains a promise of pleasure, I should like to emphasize the fact that no immediate objective of a desire ever lacks some objective content, which is no less immediate than the pleasantness.

„And then, are there not cases in which it is not only a hypothesis, but also an observable, a phenomenal fact that the pleasure springs from the very success of striving? There is what JAMES has called a 'pleasure of achievement', a joy that we have accomplished the thing, that we are making headway, that the obstacles are being surmounted, a joy of victory - and, corresponding to it on the negative side, there is a sorrow of failure, of defeat. I willingly admit that sometimes, in play, we strive and act for the joy of winning. But this does not do away with the fact that the pleasure comes from the very success of the striving.

„I should also like to refer to those by no means infrequent cases in which a person does something that he knows is fatal to himself and will never allow him to reap any enjoyment from the result. Sacrifice with absolute assurance of death, and no belief in rewards beyond - an atheist shooting a dictator to save his nation - that is what I have in mind.

„But even if a person may hope that he will live to see it, the enjoyment need not, properly speaking, be his 'goal'. A mother does not love and suffer for her children 'in order to' enjoy them. One does not hope for the victory of the good cause 'in order to' enjoy it. There is a deep truth in the saying that happiness comes from the side.

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One cannot aim at it. To seek it is to lose it.

„Even the anticipation of sorrow cannot stop every desire. Reading the letter of Marianna ALCOFORADO, I came upon these words: ‘...ich weiß ganz genau, ...daß ich es vorziehe, in der Liebe zu Dir elend zu sein, als Dich nie gesehen zu haben.’<sup>10</sup> Contrasted with this, FREUD’s pleasure-principle tends to look a bit - flat, though it too is about ‘love’. SHAND’s ‘law of attraction’, according to which ‘sorrow, though a painful emotion, always manifests a certain attraction to its object’<sup>11</sup>, is certainly more to the point.

„This is“, our hormist remarks, „about all I have to say as far as facts are concerned. Hormism is a theory which transcends observable facts in order to reach a unifying point of view. What I have to say from now on is admittedly hypothetical. The ‘causing conation’, i.e., the conation from the success of which, according to hormistic theory, pleasure arises, need not be a conscious conation. If I run into, or discover, a pleasant sensation - to refer to point 4 of the honorable gentleman on the hedonistic side - the causing conation is not claimed to be identical with the conscious conation of holding on to this pleasant experience, though this conscious conation is claimed to be some sort of conscious elaboration of that causing conation. If, for instance, one comes upon a certain flavor that proves to be pleasant, the causing conation may be some chemical need of the body which only the substance carrying the flavor is capable of satisfying. In other words: When no suitable conscious conations are to be discovered, hormism admittedly makes use of unconscious ones - which are ‘conations’ only by analogy.

„Here is another application of the principle of unconscious conations: Take the case of a pain in my finger. To account for the unpleasantness of the pain, hormism is obliged to assume the frustration of some conation. The striving away from a pain cannot be the conation that caused the pain. But why should the causing conation not be one away from the injurious state or process that ‘underlies’ the pain - as Mc DOUGALL once pointed out?<sup>12</sup>

„And as for the pleasure derived from those sensory qualities that cannot be considered to be related to the satisfaction of any major need, there is, as ALLEN has shown<sup>13</sup>, always an open door for

<sup>10</sup> Translated by R. M. Rilke as „Portugiesische Briefe,“ 3<sup>d</sup> letter (*Gesammelte Werke*, Leipzig, 1930, vol. VI, p. 128)

<sup>11</sup> Alexander Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, London, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1926, p. 320. S. Freud, „Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning,“ *Collected Papers* vol. IV, pp. 13-21, London, 1934.

<sup>12</sup> William McDougall, „Pleasure, Pain and Conation,“ *Brit. J. Psychol.*, vol. XVII (1927), pp. 171-180.

<sup>13</sup> A. H. B. Allen, *Pleasure and Instinct*, London and New York, 1930.

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assuming the existence of a 'craving for stimulation' in the corresponding receptors. Colors, odors, sounds which are not bound up with any of the 'homeostatic states'<sup>14</sup> might be pleasant because they satisfy this craving for stimulation in the optical, olfactory, and acoustical receptors, and unpleasant when they frustrate some other conation such as, for instance, one toward balance of function.

„I admit that hormism is pretty generous in postulating conations. But a lack of verification is no disprove of a postulate that rounds off a theory. That's all I wanted to say, concerning theory.“

Again it seems to me - I cannot help it - that of the first seven points of the hormist, the factual or phenomenological ones, every one is a positive contribution to real insight into the nature of pleasure and striving. None of them contradicts any of the ten points of the hedonist. Here then are seventeen points to which one theoretical curve will have to do justice. They present an *aporia* only to those who are resolved to throw in their stakes with one of two alternatives blind to each other's merits, „hedonism“ or „hormism“ in the conventional senses. As for the theoretical reflections with which the hormist ended, all I want to say at this juncture is that, superfluous as they might be, they are likewise in no conflict whatsoever with anything the hedonist had to contribute. However, before we attempt to frame a theory, a vast task still awaits our labor: a thorough phenomenological analysis of the entire relational texture of pleasure and striving.<sup>15</sup>

## I. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF PLEASURE

4. The question of whether we strive for objects or for the pleasure they give can hardly be discussed until we know what pleasure is and how it is related to „objects.“<sup>16</sup> When we say we enjoy something or strive for something, we are likely to name one of three different „levels“ of objects, examples of which - proceeding from the outside inwards - would be: the wine, the drinking of the wine, and the sensory experiences in drinking the wine. Let us call the first the „object“, the second our „communication with the object“, and the

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<sup>14</sup> This term was introduced by W. B. Cannon to designate certain bodily equilibria such as the sugar concentration of the blood, a disturbance of which the organism has certain mechanisms to counteract. *The Wisdom of the Body*, New York, 1932.

<sup>15</sup> In the following, little use will be made of laboratory findings on pleasantness. To me most of them do not seem to bear on our problem (nor, for that matter, on much of a problem at all). However, the reader is referred to the painstaking compilation of experimental material contained in Beebe-Center's book, *The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness*, New York, 1932.

<sup>16</sup> Here and in the following I shall refrain from encumbering my speech with constant references to the negative side, i. e., to displeasure, unpleasantness, and sorrow, as long as the two sides are symmetrical, and consequently what holds of pleasantness is true, but for the sign, of unpleasantness as well.



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third our „experiences in communication with the object“ (this last is the „immediate objective correlate“ of the pleasure). The former two are objective facts; the latter is a subjective experience.

Now if the hedonist holds that the various objects we strive are nothing but means or sources of pleasure, and if his opponent denies this, we should like to know which one of the three levels of objects is meant. For plainly the wine is no more than a „means“ (a „means of satisfaction“ - „Genußmittel“ in German - as we sometimes say); nor is the drinking of the wine sought for its own sake, but for the pleasant sensory experiences it yields. So if we call these pleasant sensory experiences „pleasure“, the statement that the „objects“ we strive for are nothing but means or sources of pleasure becomes, so far as the sphere of sensory experiences is concerned, an indisputable commonplace. If, however, the hedonist understands by „object“ the third or innermost level of objects, i.e., the sensory experiences in drinking the wine, and calls *them* a means or mere source of pleasure, he surely ventures upon treacherous ground. It is here that we shall begin our analysis.

The question is: Can an immediate objective correlate such as the experienced flavor of the wine be called a mere „source“ of pleasure in the same sense as the wine, or refer to Kant's simile, in the same sense as the rock or the sand is a source of gold? A product like gold emancipates itself from, and exists independently of, its source. Is the pleasure separable from the flavor in the same sense? Clearly not. The experience of pleasure remains dependent upon the experience of the flavor (or whatever other source it may have). One cannot concentrate on the former to the neglect of the latter.<sup>17</sup> This dependence is even closer than a mere continuous causation where cause and effect are, each of them, a completely equipped, or „concrete“ reality - as are the soil and the plant in the physical realm, or the contrast-introducing and the contrast-receiving field in the realm of visual experience. Pleasure is an essentially incomplete experience. It exists only as a „side“ or „property,“ as an „abstract part“ (Husserl)<sup>18</sup> of a more comprehensive experience. It is *pleasantness of something*,

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<sup>17</sup> Though this becomes more evident as one proceeds from purely sensory to emotional, cognitive, and aesthetic pleasures, it has been unanimously observed by Zoneff Meumann, Nafe, Wohlgemut, Geiger, and others. Cf. M. Geiger, „Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen,“ *Münchener philosophische Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 125 ff.

A. Wohlgemuth, „Pleasure-Unpleasure,“ *Brit. J. Psychol., Monog. Suppl.*, vol. II (1919), no. 6.

John Paul Nafe, „An Experimental Study of the Affective Qualities,“ *Amer. J. Psychol.*, vol. XXXV (1924), pp. 507-544.

Zoneff and Meumann, „Über Begleiterscheinungen psychologischer Vorgänge in Athem und Puls,“ *Philos. Stud.*, vol. XVIII (1901), p. 1.

<sup>18</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Halle, 1928, vol. II, 1, III, „Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen.“

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more precisely: a *tone of pleasantness* or *hedonic tone pervading an experience*. The flavor of the wine is, as it were, „aglow with pleasantness.“

This does not make pleasantness an „attribute“ of experience. Külpe has once and for all pointed out that the pleasantness, say, of a flavor, is not of the same order as its quality, intensity or duration.<sup>19</sup> For an attribute in the strict sense, apart from having no attributes of its own, is an essential constituent that cannot be reduced to zero without annihilating the total experience. Pleasantness, however, may be absent, for a sensation may be indifferent, that is, neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Pleasantness, then, is an accidental property - much as the price of a thing is not concrete part of it but an accidental property which it assumes „in relation to“ economic exchange, and which may be reduced to zero without affecting its existence.

Perhaps pleasantness too has something relational about it. For though it pervades, or issues from, this or that experience, it also seems, in a singular fashion, to extend to and to affect the very center of the field of experience, the self. Experiences are known to differ in the dimension of subjectivity. Generically speaking, a color is more subjective than a number, a warmth more than a color, a pleasantness more than a warmth. Of all the properties of an experienced flavor, its pleasantness is the most *subjective*. By this we do not mean primarily that it is more dependent from the present state of the organism than is, for example, the peculiar shade of tartness, but that, in a phenomenal sense, it more truly „affects the self.“ For the pleasantness of experience does not indicate a feature of the external object, but a way in which it *affects me*, i.e., a way I „feel.“ In other words: pleasure is a *feeling-tone*.

It is, of course, always possible to extend the name of a feeling to its cause. Thus pleasantness comes to denote a property of the object (an „objective meaning“) - as when we speak of pleasant weather or of a pleasant odor. This property persists though the experience itself may end or cease to be pleasant, either because we have had enough of it or because some distraction does not permit the object really to affect us so as to be enjoyed. However the pleasantness of an object should not at any cost be confused with an actual feeling-tone of pleasantness pervading an actual experience. P. T. Young was right by insisting that the problem of „mixed feelings“ (the question of whether two opposite feeling-tones may exist at the same time) should be kept clear of the „objective meaning“ of pleasantness.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Oswald Külpe, *Outlines of Psychology* E. B. Titchener, New York, 1895, p. 227.

<sup>20</sup> For Young's polemic against certain premature conclusions in Wohlgemuth's monograph „Pleasure-Unpleasure,“ see P.T. Young „An Experimental Study of Mixed Feelings,“ *Amer. J. Psychol.*, vol. XXIX (1918), pp. 237-71.

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5. A feeling-tone of pleasantness may reside in any kind of experience. We have so far drawn our examples from the field of sensory enjoyment. In sensory pleasure the immediate object is of the nature of a sensation (e. g., the flavor of the wine), while the outer object (the wine) is nothing but a cause of sensation, a „means“ avowedly sought on behalf of the (sensory) experience it yields. We shall now turn to a kind of pleasant experience that is as different from sensory pleasure as could be. Let us consider a case like that of enjoying - or better rejoicing over - the victory of the good cause. The outer object would here be the victory of the good cause, considered as an objective situation or state of affairs. The „experience in communicating with the object“ would be my actual consciousness that the good cause has triumphed. And for somebody who really thinks it is the good cause, and who is at all sensitive to the goodness of the cause, this consciousness is imbued, or aglow, with a feeling-tone of pleasantness. Now a consciousness of a situation or state of affairs is clearly a non-sensory experience. That does not mean that no sensory cues are involved. After all, the fact became known for certain (visual or auditory) sensations. But the point is that it only was „mediated“ or *conveyed* by sensory experiences. (This sensory perceptions are so often absorbed by their conveying function that they can hardly be said to be „experienced.“ In other cases some of the radiance of the event they convey communicates itself to the sensory messengers, thus lending them a sort of secondary pleasantness, as with „sweet words.“) In any case, the primary pleasantness is in the consciousness of the situation, not in the sensations or the perceptions themselves. How different is the role of sensation in sensory enjoyment. The gustatory sensations aroused in eating a good beefsteak are pleasant in „themselves“; it is their very „stuff“ that is enjoyed, not something which they mediate only. They may, besides, convey something else - for instance, that life is grand or that the cook was a „find“ - but that would be an altogether accidental and secondary function. In the sensory enjoyment itself sensations do not thus „transcend themselves.“

On the whole, a consciousness of a situation is not pleasant without also being the immediate correlate of some particular *emotion*. If, for example, the victory of the good cause was in no small measure due to my own efforts, the consciousness is tinged with an emotion of achievement or pride, and the immediate object of pleasure would then be „the proud consciousness of having helped the good cause to win.“ In other cases the dominating emotion may be gratitude or gratified revenge. But whether tinged with some such specific emotional shade or not, any pleasant consciousness of a welcome situation

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is precisely what we call a *joy*. There is proud joy, malicious joy, grateful joy, there is the tender, proud and grateful joy of the mother at her child's happiness; the element, however, which all joys have in common and which makes them joys, is this pleasant consciousness that something we value has come about.

This implies that joy is always „about“ something, i. e., that its object is not merely its cause but at the same time the pole of an objective reference. It has direction, or, as the schoolmen put it, „intention.“ We rejoice „over,“ are glad „at“ something. This objective reference is more than just a formal property; it is symptomatic of an important difference between sensory pleasure and joy with regard to striving. In sensory pleasure the object, e. g., the wine, is a means sought on behalf of the experience caused by it. We aim at the experience.<sup>21</sup> But in the joy which has just been described, the object, e. g., the victory of the good cause, is not a „means.“ In hoping and fighting for it, we do not aim the experience of it. Much as we enjoy the victory, much as the feeling in knowing it is a pleasant one, we do not seek the victory in order to enjoy the feeling. No matter how we choose our words, here is a difference that is invariant against terminology. If a hard-boiled hedonist should insist that „fundamentally“ there is no difference, that the object is always sought on behalf of the experience in spite of any queer illusions we may have about it, all we should have to answer is that then the terms would not apply in the same sense. One cannot kill a difference. To attribute it to an illusion would oblige us to explain why we should be so deceived, i. e., why we should willingly regard the wine as a means, but not the victory. Since nobody has managed, not even seriously tried, to explain the difference on grounds of pure belief or will to believe, we are save in saying that it must have its basics in the different objective constitutions of sensory pleasure and personal joy.

There are different kinds of joy. What seems to me to be the most important distinction is that between the joys that *grow from sentiments* and those that do not. Whenever there is a sentiment, a devotion, a love for something, we respond with joy to any enhancement of the object.<sup>22</sup> Its progress or victory is an enhancement of the loved cause, its thriving, happiness, and handsomeness is an enhancement of the loved child, its being successful or victorious is an enhancement of the loved self. Thus any sentiment is a potential soil of joy. Of all pleasures, the joys that spring from sentiments are the

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. above. This is not the tenet of hedonism. The hedonist would say that we aim at the pleasantness of the experience.

<sup>22</sup> This is the principal joy of sentiment since it does not presuppose any personal response on the part of the object. Cf. Schelers definition of love as „Bewegung zum höheren Wert (des Objekts)“ in his *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, Bonn, 1931, pp. 176 ff.

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most „personal“ ones. Examples of joys that do not, or need not, presuppose a sentiment are the so-called *joys of desire*, such as the joy at getting the good thing (joy of attainment), or the joy at the good thing's drawing nearer or being certain (joy of anticipation). The dynamical joys (cf. below) too are independent of sentiments.

A second distinction separates *self-containing* joys from others, the object of which contains no overt reference to the self. The victory of the good cause need not include the self. But if it is *my* victory, and if this active contribution of mine looms large in my rejoicing, then the object of joy does include the self, being the object of a self regarding sentiment. The same is true of the joy of excelling, of superiority („I“ am better than the other). A self-containing joy that contains the self in a more receptive way is the joy of being loved or recognized. The most notable species of self-containing joy is the *joy of success* (what James has called „pleasure of achievement“). This kind of joy is of particular significance for our discussion of the relationship between pleasure and striving, for it is the one case in which „success of striving“ figures in the very object of joy. I wish to draw attention to the fact that the success in this joy plays a part exactly analogous to that of the child's happiness in the tender joy of a mother. In other words, if a hormic explanation tracing all pleasure to success of striving should apply to both cases, it can at least not apply in the same sense. (One cannot kill a difference.) It is unwise to merge into one generality such conspicuous differences as (1) the joy of *success*, in which my success in attaining the thing is enjoyed, (2) the joy of *attainment*, in which it is the attainment of the desired thing that is enjoyed without any active effort of mine having played a part, and (3) the joy of the very *thing* attained.

The joy of success does not necessarily involve much reference to the self. It may be of a much more immediate character, springing from the dynamics of the activity itself. This leads us to a third distinction, that between the cognitive-emotional joys so far primarily considered and the *dynamical joys*. While in cognitive-emotional joys the pleasantness resides in an emotional consciousness that something we value has come about, dynamical joys are based upon a kind of experience that lies somewhere between emotion proper and sensation: the tensions, excitements, thrills, and relief of acting and resting. Here belong the delights of driving at high speed, of fishing and hunting, of playing games, of following a plot (e. g., in reading a good detective story), etc. It was not without some basis in observation that Wundt regarded excitement-quiescence and tension-relaxation as dimensions of feeling (besides pleasantness-unpleasantness). They con-

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tain too much objective reference - excitement „about“ tension „toward“ something - and also too immediate an involvement of the self to be reduced to masses of organic sensations after the fashion of the James-Lange theory. They are quasi-emotions, somewhat akin to those (more static) feelings which Scheler has called „Vitalgefühle,“ vital feelings; these comprise the feeling of vigor, buoyancy, languidness, etc., and give rise to *vital joys*. Because of their partly sensory and relatively uncognitive character the dynamical as well as the vital joys may be distinguished as „pleasure-joys“ from the other joys.

It is interesting to compare the dynamical joys of advancing, conquering, succeeding, derived as they are, in their purest form, from play and sport, with the joys of sentiment. Whereas it is quite impossible to pursue the end of a sentiment for the sake of the experience without impairing the very sentiment itself, it is possible to do this in the case of the end of a game. True, not even a game permits us to make light of its (immanent) end while the game is in progress; but we are able to set up those ends for the sake of the thrill of pursuing them - an to know all the while that we have done so. All pursuit of ends lies somewhere between a sentiment's real absorption in the end itself, and the playful make-believe where, in Pascal's words, „on aime mieux la chasse que la prise.“<sup>23</sup> In joys of sentiment the experience is never the aim.<sup>24</sup> In dynamical joys the experience is the aim of action, but while in progress, the activity demands the aiming at some objective end. In sensory pleasure the experience is the aim in every respect. Hedonism is prone to overlook these fundamental differences.

A fourth distinction separates joy from *joyful mood*. Joys, as well as sorrows, may detach themselves from their particular reference or motive and develop into all pervading moods. (The immediate objective of such a mood may be a consciousness of well-being, fitness, gloominess, impotence, etc.). In other cases the development is in the opposite direction: the experience begins as a mood - a pleasant or unpleasant „cloud of consciousness“ with no particular orientation - an then casts about for something concrete to fasten upon.

Happiness is a general emotion of joy which refers to the total state of things, i. e., to one's total situation. Since the actual world of a child covers so much smaller a range of time as well as of implication than the world of an adult, the child is quicker in gaining and losing happiness. Happiness has been characterized as a pleasure which

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<sup>23</sup> *Pensées*, ed. Brunschwig, Paris, 1904, n. 139 (vol. II, p. 56)

<sup>24</sup> Unless the sentiment is a „sentimental“ one. However this kind of sentimental exploitation of one's sentiments is bound to detract from the depth of all emotions and joys to which the sentiment gives birth.

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takes possession of one's whole being. This I regard as an ambiguous statement for lust does so too - at least of all that is left of it. Happiness, on the other hand, contains some view of the whole, however vaguely conceived. The whole of existence appears in colorful light. James aptly stressed its kinship to „cosmic emotion.“<sup>25</sup> It is also akin in several respects to „mood“ as well as to „Vitalgefühl“ (from which often „evaporates“):<sup>26</sup> it has no particular motive, it often arises from inner causes as in well known pathological states of „euphoria,“ and it imparts its radiance to everything that happens to shine upon.<sup>27</sup>

6. There is, besides sensory pleasure, and the various kinds of joy, a third type of pleasant experience which may, perhaps, best be introduced by way of the peculiar relation it bears to sensory experience. Sensations, besides being enjoyed in themselves, as in sensory pleasure, or functioning as a means of communicating something through percepts, as in joy, may also be *expressive* of something. Thus the appearance of a weather-beaten tree may express undaunted tenacity; the stroking of a hand may express tender solicitude; a Mozart Rondo may express sprightliness and gaiety; a wide view may express infinity, and widen our hearts. *Aesthetic enjoyment* is the principal, though not the only instance of enjoying something expressed in the process of expression. In order to be „expressive“ sensations must be organized in percepts as in the case of mediation. However, whereas the mediating function requires nothing more than unequivocal coordination of percept and expressed, no matter how conventional, the expressive function demands some sort of real likeness, some basic identity of structure between the percept and that which it expresses. The essence of the percept must be of a piece with the essence it stands for, the softness of touch with the softness of feeling, the briskness of melody with the briskness of spirit. Now in aesthetic enjoyment the immediate objective correlate of pleasantness is precisely „the expressed within the expressing.“ The sensory or perceptual material, whether created by the artist or offered by nature, is not self-sufficient or „blind“ as in the case of sensory enjoyment. Nor is it transitory or of merely extrinsic significance as in the act of conveying some welcome state of affairs. It is *intrinsically significant* in that it expresses something *transcending it yet shared by it*: some

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<sup>25</sup> W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London and New York, 1902, p. 79.

<sup>26</sup> M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Werteethik*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Halle, 1921, pp. 350 ff.

<sup>27</sup> P. Eke [???], Zur Phänomenologie [?] und Klinik der Glücksgefühle. *Monographien aus dem Gesamtgebiet der Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, ed. by O. Förster & K. Wilmanns, Berlin, 1924, Heft 39.)

The hierarchical account McDougall gives of the triple pleasure-joy-happiness (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 134), though good in some respects, is too hypothetical for our present phenomenological purposes.

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universal and selfless quality of emotion<sup>28</sup> that is as truly without as it is within us.

Needless to say, it is not only in the realm of aesthetics that sensory experiences may be expressive and as such enjoyed. Needless to say also, the three major types of experience which we have found to be possible seats, or immediate objective correlates, of pleasantness may well be present in one and the same concrete case of experience. A caress, for example, may draw from all three sources of pleasantness, being a focus of amorous sensations and a testimony as well as an immediate expression of love and tenderness. There are, furthermore, pleasant experiences of which it becomes difficult to say whether they belong more to the sensory or to the expressive type. Colors and sounds may have affective tones even when presented alone and thereby reduced at best to a limited expressiveness. („Associated experiences,“ so popular in the early days of psychological aesthetics - cf. Fechner - are no longer believed to be the core of the matter.)

Aesthetic enjoyment, though radically different from sensory pleasure resembles it in one respect that is of interest to us here: in both cases we aim at the experience. We are no more ultimately interested in the existence of the symphony than we are in that of the wine. Both exist for the sake of being enjoyed.

[This has been a broad survey of the major types of pleasant experience. We owe to Max Scheler (*Der Formalismus in der Ethik...* pp. 340ff.) an account of the „stratification of the emotional life“ which is enlightening whether or not one agrees with his hierarchy of the „sensory,“ the „vital“, the „emotional“ (*seelische*), and the „mental“ or „spiritual“ (*geistige*) feelings - a hierarchy that is a bit rigid and incomplete besides, lacking, for instance, a proper place for aesthetic enjoyment. In any case, the *sensory* feelings are aptly characterized by Scheler in the following respects: (1) possessing some bodily reference, (2) self-sufficient rather than „intentional,“ i. e., not about something, (3) relatively impersonal, (4) actual, i. e., not imaginable, (5) meaningless, i. e., little integrated with the remainder of the emotional life, (6) observable, (7) voluntarily producible (manageable). We shall in due time see the significance especially of (6) and (7) for our principal problem, while (4) will prove to be misleading.

Scheler is right assigning these sensory feelings to a relatively

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<sup>28</sup> The term „emotional quality“ is here used in the enlarged sense of the Struktur- and Gestalt-psychologists (Klages, Krüger, Köhler...) to refer to that wide range of qualities which are as genuinely subjective traits of feeling as they are objective traits of spatial perception, such as, for instance, softness, fierceness, gloominess, vastness, uproar, relaxation, peace... The question, however, of why the aesthetic expression of such qualities should convey enjoyment will not even be touched upon in the present paper.



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peripheral place or „stratum“ within the total make-up of the emotional life. He is also right in differentiating them (as we have done) from what he calls the „vital feelings“, e. g., vigor, fatigue, etc., which possess an immediate (phenomenal) reference to one's biological well-being and thus may be said to represent a less peripheral stratum of feelings. Both of these strata again are rightly distinguished from a still more central, or „personal“ stratum containing the joys and sorrows (cf. our cognitive-emotional experiences), as well as from that most central and least manageable stratum of happiness (*Seligkeit*) and despair.

Scheler (pp. 349f.) suggests some interesting applications of his discriminating analysis. Thus he points out, for example, that people possessed with the idea of „social reform“ are likely to overemphasize those strata of human welfare that are „manageable,“ depending on external or material goods rather than upon the way a person makes his terms, and finds his balance, with life as a whole. The way Marxian materialism defines happiness would be a case in point. We shall come upon another application in our treatment of the problem of „mixed feelings.“]

7. The distinction between different types or strata of pleasant experience brings us face to face with the old dilemma of whether or not pleasures exhibit qualitative differences. If pleasure is treated as if it were a separate event, a full-fledged unit of experience, evoked or released by objective conditions, the issue of qualitative differences seems to be inevitable. Outstanding psychologists have been equally positive in asserting strictly antagonistic views. On one side Ribot, for example, holds that the „physical pain,“ of a toothache is - *qua* pain - identical with the „moral pain“ expressed in Michelangelo's sonnet,<sup>29</sup> and, according to Ebbinghaus: „Die Lust an der behaglichen Wärme ist rein als solche nicht anderer Art als die an einer ansprechenden Melodie oder an der glücklichen Vollendung einer künstlerischen Leistung...“<sup>30</sup> On the other side Lipps finds it absurd to regard the pleasure in the amusing as being of the same quality as that in the sublime,<sup>31</sup> and Hobhouse is much of the same opinion.<sup>32</sup>

I doubt whether there could have been quite so much disagreement if the two sides had worked with the same conceptual model of pleasure. The postulation of different qualities of pleasure becomes completely nonsensical if pleasure is recognized to be only an aspect or tone of a more comprehensive experience, the specific quality of

<sup>29</sup> Th. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, New York, 1903, pp. 42-3.

<sup>30</sup> Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1902, vol. I, p. 553.

<sup>31</sup> Th. Lipps, *Psychologische Untersuchungen*, Leipzig, 1912, vol. II, pp. 81 ff.

<sup>32</sup> L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, London, 1921, pp. 54 f.

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which it is accordingly bound to share in the most immediate way. The quality of the pleasantness pervading a tickle-sensation is precisely the quality of the tickle-sensation and the quality of the pleasantness pervading the happy consciousness of an important life is precisely the quality of the happy consciousness of an important life. That is to say, the feeling-tone of pleasantness shares the quality, depth, and dignity of its immediate objective correlate. Being merely the tone of something, it has no properties of its own aside from its „algedonic“ character and its intensity ranging from extreme pleasantness through indifference to extreme unpleasantness.<sup>33</sup> The degrees of intensity are often more accurately described as degrees of saturation (of an experience with pleasantness) that are characteristic of the experience in question. Lust, for instance, is so highly saturated with pleasantness that it has usurped its very name.<sup>34</sup>

8. Is it possible to have several hedonic experiences at the same time, in algebraic summation or as phenomenally separate events? This is the question of *coexisting* and *mixed feelings*.

Let us survey the field of possibilities. (1) The third, c-e, sounds pleasant, so does d-f. But when struck together, they give rise to one unpleasant experience. That is to say: if two objects become part of one new configuration to the extent of losing their former characters, they thereby also lose their hedonic tones, giving way to whatever hedonic tone the new configuration possesses.

(2) The case of a banquet composed of tasty dishes, pretty flowers, inspiring people, gay music, etc., is a more difficult one. I see here three possible types of composite enjoyment: (a) enjoyment of the *festiveness*. Festiveness or cheerfulness is a new configuration, but differs from case (1) in that it contains some reference to the separate enjoyabilities of its various components, (b) *fluctuation* between the enjoyment of the various components on the one hand and the enjoyment of the festiveness on the other hand, (c) *blending* of the concordant enjoyments (some sort of „summation“). With reference to (a) and (b), the enjoyment of a festive entertainment is, formally, similar to the beauty of a bouquet of flowers: there is the beauty of the bouquet as a whole, and there is the beauty of individual flowers or groups of flowers. Whether (c), the third possibility, really exists is difficult to say. I am under the impression that it does, but the phenomenological evidence at my disposal is not wholly unambiguous. Pending further evidence, I shall regard the

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<sup>33</sup> Stumpf, in claiming that sensory pleasures and pains are "Gefühlsempfindungen" i. e., of the nature of sensations, seems to have overlooked the universality of pleasantness and unpleasantness, which surely extend beyond the realm of sensation. Carl Stumpf, "Ueber Gefühlsempfindungen," *Ztsch. f. Psychol.*, vol. XLIV, pp. 1. ff.

<sup>34</sup> "Lust" is the German equivalent for "pleasure."

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existence of a blending of concordant enjoyments as a likelihood. The case of a caress containing sensory, emotional, and expressive elements of enjoyment seems to be a good instance of a blending of concordant hedonic elements.

(3) The unpleasantness of a toothache and the pleasantness of a beautiful view are not likely to coexist - not so much because the two hedonic tones have opposite signs, but rather because the two underlying experiences or attitudes are incompatible. The pain so „absorbs me“ that I cannot give myself over to the view enough really to enjoy it, or, on the other hand, the view may absorb me away from the pain. For two attitudes or absorptions thus to detract from each other, it is not all necessary that the two hedonic tones be opposite. I have made experiments like the following: while listening to the *marche funebre* in Beethoven's seventh, I ate a piece of delicious candy and observed whether I could maintain the two enjoyments unimpaired alongside each other. It was impossible. The attitudes required were too heterogeneous. (Of course I was able to fluctuate back and forth between the two, and I was also able to know their objective enjoyability. But the two enjoyments could not be brought to exist simultaneously.) Light music and candy would have been a different affair, because they might at least have been „concordant“ (cf. case 2c). That two pains may also interfere with each other is known. At critical moments in the dentist's chair it is not bad diplomacy to pinch oneself.<sup>35</sup> Much of this intolerance of hedonic experiences seems to be an indication of their subjectivity as feelings, competing, as they do, for the absorption of oneself. (4) Scheler held that two feelings may coexist to the extent to which they belong to two different strata. „... Man kann 'in tiefster Seele verzweifelt' jegliche sinnliche Lust erleben, ja sogar ichzentriert genießen. ... Man kann ... unfroh ein gutes Glas Wein trinken und die Blume dieses Weines geniessen.“<sup>36</sup> It is not altogether clear whether he meant two actual feelings, but his examples show that he could not rightly have done so. For what the belonging to two different strata really facilitates is not a coexistence of the actual feelings, but rather an escape from the one by means of the other. The only difference I can see between his cases and my example of Beethoven's *marche funebre* and the candy lies in the fact, interesting in itself, that despair and also sullenness are enduring emotional dispositions which, like sentiments, have a peculiar mode of existence apart from being actually felt, a

<sup>35</sup> Cf. a somewhat provisional, because methodological undeveloped, study of the author's on the influence of one pain upon another. Karl Duncker, "Some Preliminary Experiments on the Mutual Influence of Pains." *Psychol. Forsch.*, vol. XXI (1937) pp. 311-326.

<sup>36</sup> Scheler, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

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mode of existence that, as such, may well coexist with some diverting excitement.

(5) More important than a belonging to different strata seems to be a *structural dependence of one feeling upon another* as in the case of a martyr whose joy of holy endurance is founded upon the very painfulness endured, or that of a daring mountaineer whose thrills feed upon his very shudders. I prefer, however, to leave open the question of whether in this kind of „pleasure of pain“ the two feeling-tones are really both of them actual experiences. For there is an interesting alternative the import of which extends beyond the present question of mixed feelings to our principal problem - a reason for careful inspection.

9. We are capable of putting ourselves into - or „feeling ourselves into“ - a situation which at the same time we know we are not really in. Under such conditions the feelings (which we would have had if we were really in the situation at the time) are represented in a singular fashion. They are not actually feelings, however weak. A sadist gloating over the pains of his victim is not actually suffering those pains. Yet he is, in a peculiar way feelingly aware of the suffering. If he were not capable of feeling himself into his victim's condition, he would be a ruffian, not a sadist. It is this sensitive imagination that distinguishes cruelty from rudeness. Nor do the feelings exist in the form of mere hypothetical knowledge as though derived from an inference by analogy: when I myself have been in that sort of situation I have always had that sort of feeling. Here is somebody in that situation. Therefore I assume he must have that sort of feeling. No, mere knowledge would not be food for sadistic enjoyment. Knowledge could exist with a minimum of sensitiveness. An efficient sadist, however, is a highly sensitive creature. And exactly the same is true of the other pole of sympathy: pity. The actual feeling of grief in an emotion of pity presupposes some state of being feelingly aware of the other person's suffering. (Whether this feeling awareness becomes the basis of pity or cruel joy depends upon accessory factors, such as the sentimental relationship between the observer and the sufferer and the way in which the suffering is seen with reference to the other person and to life as a whole.)

What we are really dealing with here is a unique dimension in which feelings may exist. Through „empathy“ into a situation (that is their immediate objective correlate) there arise what I shall call *empathetical* or „vicarious“ feelings. It is primarily in this mode of feeling that we share the feelings and emotions of other beings, real as well as fictitious, thereby supplying ourselves with the necessary fundaments for all the higher forms of sympathy such as pity, sym-

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pathetic joy and, for that matter, cruelty.<sup>37</sup>

To call an empathetical feeling the „image“ of a feeling would not be wrong if one is aware of an important peculiarity of emotional images. An image in the usual sense of the word is a cognitive affair. Provided one is at all capable of obtaining a certain kind of image, and provided one has not forgotten a particular item, one is able to image it at any time at will. An emotional image on the other hand, can be produced only by one who, at the time, would have been capable of the actual emotion, and, more important, an emotional image needs no separate act of imagining: the imaged situation becomes spontaneously tinged with the feeling in question. Only if we make allowance for this peculiarity of emotional images - their dependence upon, and immediate emergence from, cognitive images, as well as their dependence upon an actual existing predisposition for the real feeling in question - only then may an empathetical feeling be called an „image.“<sup>38</sup>

With the recognition of the empathetical dimension of feeling, our immediate problem of mixed feelings takes on a rather rejuvenated appearance. Perhaps that strange conglomeration of feeling elements which we came upon in the martyr and in the mountaineer is similar in make-up to that in the pitying or cruel man.

But let us leave this question open, and turn instead to a case that is both less ambiguous and historically more closely related to the question of mixed feelings: wistfulness („Wehmut“ in German). Wistfulness is the resigned sorrow in view of something delightful which had once been, or might almost have become, ours, but in whose nature it lies that it is not to be had and never will be. Considered from the point of view of its hedonic make-up, wistfulness is a struc-

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. what Scheler calls "Nachfühlen" in his *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 4 ff. Our statement that the primary way of sharing the feelings of others is through empathetical feelings is not meant to imply that it is at the same time the most primitive way. People who are not differentiated enough to keep up an imaginary sphere besides a real one (children for example), will be likely to "slip" from empathetical into actual feelings. I know a little girl who would either stop reading a book in which things became too sad, or would ask her mother to read it and tell her the story a less depressing way.

<sup>38</sup> If this should not be clear on simple inspection, we shall come upon a convincing proof later.

According to a widely held doctrine which asserts the "actuality" of feelings and emotions, our empathetical feelings could not possibly be images. Feelings and emotions are held to be not imaginable, but to exist exclusively as actual states, unless they be mere knowledge. We have seen that an empathetical feeling is neither an actual feeling nor a mere knowledge that such and such may take place if...The doctrine, therefore, does not lead us anywhere. It is a rash conclusion from the justified impression that, somehow, emotional images are "more actual" than other images.

Credit must be given to Meinong for having recognized this unique modality in which feeling and emotions may exist. Cf Alexius Meinong *Ueber Annahmen* 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1910. He speaks of "Phantasiegefühle."

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tural compound of an actual unpleasantness founded upon an empathetical pleasantness. The more pleasant the latter, the more unpleasant the former. Even the most intense pleasantness of the unattainable situation lends no grain of actual pleasantness to the present situation. On the contrary, it enhances the actual unpleasantness of our being forever „excluded from“ a real enjoyment of it. Only through some indirect realization of the objectively unreal, as is sometimes well-nigh accomplished in daydreaming, may the empathetical pleasantness of the objectively unreal situation become transformed into an actual feeling-tone of pleasantness, replacing the unpleasantness of an exclusion that is no longer felt. But in neither case, in daydreaming no more than in the pure form of wistfulness, does there exist a mixture of two actual feeling-tones. There is at best a fluctuation between the unpleasantness of felt exclusion and the pleasantness of indirect realization. Wistfulness is neither a yellow-green, as Lipps, nor an orange, as Wohlgemuth attempted to describe its hybrid nature, nor is it precisely a „sweet sorrow.“ It is a structure in two dimensions of feeling. The most important instance, however, of this kind of structure is still ahead of us.

10. We may now summarize the findings of our phenomenal analysis of pleasure: Pleasure is a property of an experience which affects the self, a feeling-tone of pleasantness that may reside in any kind of experience, the quality of which it shares: in sensory experience („pleasure“), in some consciousness of a welcome situation, in which case sense-data are primarily mediators („joy,“), and in some consciousness of expression, where sensory perception is expressive of some universal quality of emotion (most conspicuous in „aesthetic enjoyment“). Important subtypes of joy are: Joy from sentiment (which either contains the self or not); joy of desire, i. e., of anticipation or attainment; dynamical and vital pleasure-joys; joyful mood; and happiness. Joy of achievement lies between dynamical and self-containing joy. In sensory pleasure the object is an extrinsic means to pleasant experience; in dynamical pleasure-joy, as the sustaining end of the activity, it is likewise a means; in aesthetic enjoyment the object is an intrinsic medium of experience; and in the cognitive-emotional joy derived from a sentiment, the object is the end and chief absorption. Concordant feeling-tones seem to be able to „blend,“ but opposite feeling-tones are not likely to coexist, unless one is founded upon the other. Pleasantness occurs in two dimensions, that of actual and that of imaginary or empathetical feeling.

## II. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DESIRE

11. Suppose, after a long and warm climb in the mountains, you feel a desire for a drink of water - something corresponding to the

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words „oh, now a drink of water would be delicious.“ What are the phenomenal components of such a state of actual desire? In every desire something is *anticipated*, no matter how vaguely. In our case - let us assume the desire was not provoked by the sight or sound of water - there may be some imagelike representation by a gushing spring or a brook or a dripping glass, the particular image depending upon the form in which the water is preferred or likely to be encountered. That is to say, the anticipation may include some of the „objective circumstances“ of satisfaction - and increasingly so if the desire is backed by knowledge and elaborated into a practical plan or a daydream. At any rate there will be some representation of the „object,“ of water; not, however, of water *per se*, but of water as a part of the act of drinking, i. e., as an integral part of what we have called a „communication with the object.“ And again this communication will not be represented as an externally observable event, but as an „intimate *sensory* experience“: the cool fluidity suffusing and relieving that inner dryness. Those features of the anticipation that are sought for their own sake will be called the „*immediate objective* of the desire“ in contradistinction to the „mediate“ or remote objective that must be tackled as a part of the outer world, in order to yield those sensory features. Needless to say, the immediate objective may extend into such distant features as, for instance, the visual sparklingness of the water.

12. However, the immediate objective of a desire for water contains more than a foreshadowing of certain sensory experiences.<sup>39</sup> Sensory experiences may be anticipated without the slightest desire for them. We may anticipate the feel and flavor of water without being thirsty. (Of course the quality of „relieving this dryness“ would be lacking. But there are other desires the immediate sensory objective of which includes no elements that could not be anticipated almost identically, in the absence of desire. The peculiar juiciness and flavor of strawberries, for instance, may still be anticipated in a state of complete indifference or even disgust.) As soon, however, as there *is* desire the anticipated sensory experience becomes spontaneously, i. e., through no separate act of anticipation, imbued with a characteristic „tone of pleasantness.“ What is the nature of this pleasantness - or „promise of pleasantness“?

Plainly enough, it is no actual feeling tone, felt and enjoyed now, during desire.<sup>40</sup> That it is not equal to the feeling tone which is actually

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<sup>39</sup> Besides impulse, this element of imagination or foresight (which Shand explained by the delaying of the impulse by some obstruction) is all that writers like McDougall and Shand considered to be necessary or structural constituents of desire. (Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, pp. 400 f., McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 312 f.).

<sup>40</sup> We are here dealing with pure desire, uncomplicated by the joyful anticipation that is due to certainty of fulfillment. Cf. below.

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felt and enjoyed in the subsequent act of drinking, everybody will admit at once. But could it not be a minor edition of it, a first installment, a preliminary taste of what is to come? Than it would still be an actual feeling tone, only a relatively weak one.

It can be demonstrated that the tone of pleasantness, which, in pure desire, pervades the anticipated sensory experience is no actual feeling tone, however slight or undeveloped. Here is a little experiment. Once, on a sunny afternoon, I was walking with a friend, and, being interested in our present question, I asked him, in a reckless way, whether the image of eating a plateful of strawberries was pleasant to him at the time. He said it was. (So he desired them all right.) I insisted: „Does the idea give you an actual pleasure?“ He saw no reason for doubting it: „Yes, actual pleasure.“ (Incidentally there were no strawberries ahead and he knew it. So there was no likelihood of fulfillment.) „Well,“ I said, „if you were given the choice between indulging in this pleasant image of yours and actually eating a real plateful, which would you prefer?“ This he thought was a silly question: „Of course, the real ones.“ „Then“ I went on, „suppose I took away some of the real berries until only the less attractive specimens were left. Would you still prefer the real ones?“ He admitted that as long as the real strawberries were at all pleasant he would continue to prefer them to an image however magnificent. In other words, no equation could be established between an actual pleasure however small and an anticipated pleasure however great. We agreed that we were dealing with *magnitudes in different dimensions*, and that, if the pleasure of eating was an actual feeling tone, the other „feeling tone“ represented no actual feeling at all.

For those who think they see a flaw in this argument, I have another one. Suppose somebody is really suffering from thirst, an explorer, for instance, caught in the desert. We have descriptions of what such people have to live through that show, among other things, how indefinitely torturing the image of drinking may be. Here is desire at its maximum, and the anticipated pleasantness of drinking is beyond words. If this tone were an actual feeling tone, the matter could not be quite so bad - and Tantalus might have been an Epicurean after all. Of course this pleasantness might be so overshadowed by the unpleasantness derived from actual conditions of the body, such as the sticky dryness in mouth and throat, the dizziness, etc., that the balance might still be a negative one. However there is no arguing against this kind of subtraction, the sheer possibility of which seems to make our case of desire for strawberries a better case after all.<sup>41</sup> Begging the

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<sup>41</sup> Sully, whose analysis of desire, next to Meinong's (see above) comes closest to the one given here, holds, in fact, that the represented delight, which he takes for an actual pleasure, may be quenched by the pain of want. James Sully, *The human mind*, New York, 1892, vol. II, pp. 199-200.



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reader to postpone further objections until after our discussion of joyful anticipation and pleasant foretaste, I shall then regard it as settled for the time being that the tone of pleasantness inhering in the immediate objective of pure desire is *not an actual feeling tone* however faint.

But what else could it be? Certainly Px (as we shall call this puzzling kind of pleasantness) is more than „knowledge.“ The phrase „oh now water would be delicious“ stands for something totally different from the conclusion of a syllogism: Water has always proved to be delicious when drunk in thirst. I am thirsty now (my mouth is dry...). Therefore water would be delicious. No, that pleasantness is *not mere knowledge* that something would occur if...Its specific modality is as far from mere knowledge as it is from actual feeling.

To call Px an „anticipated feeling tone“ and leave it at that would not be very enlightening and might even be misleading. We anticipate events by way of „images.“ Is Px the image of a feeling tone - in the same sense as the other component of the anticipation may be said to be the image, however rudimentary, of a sensory experience? This does not seem to be the case. Sensory experiences such as sights, flavors, odors, contacts, etc., can be anticipated in a state of indifference or disgust no less than in desire.<sup>42</sup> The feeling tone anticipated in desire, however, can only be realized during desire. Moreover it needs no separate act of anticipation once one is desirous: the anticipated sensory experience becomes spontaneously imbued with it. In other words, the same (organic) condition that endows the actual experience with an actual pleasantness endows the anticipated experience with Px, and does so with the same immediacy. This, however, means that Px fulfils all the criteria by which, on a previous occasion, we have learned to distinguish another dimension of feeling from actual feeling; it means that Px is an *empathetical feeling*. It arises from feeling oneself into a situation which at the same time one knows and feels that one is not actually in.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> I am, of course not claiming that all anticipated sensory features are entirely unaffected by states of desire. That this is not the case in thirst has already been pointed out. Furthermore, according to unpublished findings of Erwin Levy, there are indications that in a state of bodily need the global experiences and probably also the threshold for the corresponding sensory qualities are changed and under certain conditions raised. This, I think, cannot but affect the corresponding anticipation as well (e. g., the juiciness of an apple may appear affected when thirst is very great).

<sup>43</sup> It is Meinong who came closest to our own position "...dass, wer begehrt, das Begehrte nicht nur vorstellt, sondern es zum Gegenstand einer Annahme (wie es wäre, wenn) machen muss, durch welche das dem Begehren wesentliche Objektiv gegeben wird (p. 307)...auf diese Annahme (wird) ganz ähnlich wie auf die beim Erfassen eines Kunstwerks sich einstellenden Annahme durch ein Phantasiegefühl reagiert, und diesem Phantasiegefühl ist in erster Linie jene das Begehren 'sollicitierende' Kraft beizumessen" (pp. 309 f.). Cf. *Ueber Annahmen*, ch. 8, "Zur Begehrungs- und Wertpsychologie."

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It may be mentioned here that only for the sake of coherence of presentation have we confined ourselves so far to sensory desire, i. e., to the case in which the anticipated experience is of a purely sensory kind. In much the same sense as one may desire a cool drink, one may also desire the victory of the good cause. This would be a non-sensory desire to the extent to which the joy at the victory resides in a non-sensory consciousness. Both in sensory and in non-sensory desire there is this anticipation of, or putting oneself into, an unreal situation which thereby becomes aglow with an empathetical feeling tone of pleasantness.

13. Besides the anticipated or unreal situation and the empathetical feeling tone pervading it, there is a third characteristic component of desire: a felt tendency to the self to be in that unreal situation so that it becomes the real one, or, briefly: a *tendency toward realization*. If

Fig. 1 represents the real self (rS) and the unreal situation (urs) with the unreal self (urS) and the unreal feeling tone (urf), there is some sort of tendency of rS to be in the place of urS, as represented by the arrow. In everyday language we speak either of an




Fig. 1

„attraction“ issuing from urs - „this is a very attractive (or tempting) thought,“ or of a „wanting“ issuing from rS - „I want it“ (or „I want to be there“). Since, as a rule, it is the real self that has to take the initiative, the second expression is more customary. The phenomenal tendency in desire seems to be a conscious elaboration of the tendency or need that had been initiating and maintaining the very process of anticipation, and which, but for some delaying circumstances in the situation, might not have developed beyond sheer impulse.

There are various kinds of elaboration of the tendency in desire. If the essential object of the unreal situation already really exists at some real place (e. g., the spring on yonder hillside or the friend in the town of N), and all that is lacking is my being there and really communicating with it, the tendency transforms itself into a spatial vector. If the self decides to yield to the tendency (to „follow its impulse“), this tendency is either made over into an actual intention, plotting and then pursuing some operational route that leads to the realization of urS, or, working on an imaginary plane, it may - by way of a dream or a daydream - make the self and the whole organism „believe“ that urs is the real situation (provided the kind of desire in question permits this).

14. A fourth component of desire consists in some actual feel-

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ing of unpleasantness in the real situation: some *unpleasantness of want*. If I desire something very much the state I am actually in is likely to be unpleasant. This unpleasantness of want may be one of two different kinds; which kind it will be apparently depends upon whether the desire is primarily a bodily one, originating in the disturbance of some homeostatic state, or whether it is a more personal one. An example of the first kind of unpleasantness would be that inhering in the sticky dryness of a thirsty mouth and throat, or that in the pangs arising from the contractions of a hungry stomach. The second kind of unpleasantness, on the other hand, inheres in the „Tantalean experience of not having the good thing desired.“

It is easy to show that hunger-pangs have nothing to do with an experience of not having the good thing. In cases of genuine „Heisshunger“ (nervous hunger) all the pangs of hunger with all their pungent unpleasantness exist without the slightest appetite for any kind of food. One eats only to be rid of the pangs. The anticipation as well as the consummation of eating may even be decidedly unpleasant and sought merely as a means of getting rid of the greater unpleasantness. The second kind of unpleasantness, residing in the very feeling that one is not having the good thing, is always of the nature of a sorrow (e. g., at not being with one's people), no matter what the good thing may be, a sensory pleasure or a joy. We shall call it *sorrow of want* (or „sorrow of exclusion“ or, lastly, „sorrow of frustration,“ - as it springs, phenomenally, from the unfulfilment of the very desire itself). We shall sharply distinguish this from the other kind of unpleasantness, exemplified by the hunger-pangs, which, for the sake of contrast, shall be named displeasure of need. Sorrow of want belongs to the group which we have called the „joys and sorrows of desire,“<sup>44</sup> If we add

to Fig. 1 the real situation (rs) of S which includes the unreal situation (urs) in the form of an actual anticipation, and a barrier (b) between urs and rS, we arrive at Fig. 2, where the - sign in rs represents the sorrow of want, or more picturesquely, the sorrow of being excluded from.




Fig. 2

Incidentally, wistfulness as described above is nothing but the resigned variant of a sorrow of exclusion.

The magnitude of a sorrow of want depends upon two variables (1) The degree of goodness of the desired thing, i. e., the intensity of the empathetical feeling tone of pleasantness. Naturally the nicer the thing which a man desires, the harder it is to be without it. (2) The

<sup>44</sup> Cf. above

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poignancy of the feeling of not having, or being excluded from the desired thing. This depends upon variables of its own. I may objectively and knowingly be excluded from something which I feel would be awfully pleasant, and still not feel sorrowful at all; this will be the case as long as the thing is felt to be wholly outside my capacity, and hence ambition, of attainment. Even that least calculating kind of desire aspiring after the love of another being (Stendhal's *amour passion*) does not allow itself to grow into a full-fledged desire that would draw deep sorrow from the fact of exclusion (or from the frustration of love) unless there has been at least some degree of feeling oneself „equal to“ satisfying it. A feeling of not having takes on a greater poignancy if it is a no-longer-having, a loss (whether of something actually or almost possessed). I may have a keen feeling of how nice it would be to live as a Maharaja, riding on a white elephant, and so forth. No matter how fertile my imagination, there would be no sorrow of frustration, as long as I was only playing with the idea. If, however, mine had been the chance to become the son-in-law of one, and the steamship ticket had already been secured, and the white elephant had already been haunting my sleep (as only those one is pretty sure of are capable of doing) - and if suddenly the Maharaja and his daughter had changed their minds, then surely there would be a sorrow of not having, of the particular type of a *sorrow of disappointment or loss*. For then the thing would clearly have been „within my sphere.“

15. Any unpleasantness of want, whether it is a sorrow of exclusion or a displeasure of need, is the basis of a *negative desire*. A negative desire is one away from something (an „aversion“). If I have a toothache or some mental (or personal) grievance I desire to get rid of it. What is anticipated in a negative desire is *relief* from some kind of actually unpleasant experience. Compared with the anticipation in positive desire, the anticipated experience in negative desire is exceedingly meager. Unless some „objective circumstance“ of the desired relief is pictured as well, the qualitative specificity is all on the side of the actual experience, leaving to the anticipated experience nothing original but the element of relief, endowed with an empathetical feeling tone of pleasantness. The chief difference between positive and negative desire consists in the direction of the tendency. While in positive desire the self feels a tendency to be in the unreal situation, thereby realizing it, in negative desire the primary tendency is to quit the real situation (thereby irrealizing it). On the feeling side, the difference lies in the fact that in positive desire the primary feeling tone is an empathetical one of pleasantness, and the secondary feeling tone is an actual one, a sorrow of want, while in negative desire the

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primary feeling tone is an actual one of unpleasantness, and the secondary feeling tone is an empathetical one, a joy of relief. As a rule a negative desire away from a present unpleasantness of want has the same objective direction as the positive desire; this circumstance might tempt one to believe that they are really two ends or aspects of the same thing. This, however, is not the case. For the specific objective of a negative desire may also be attained in a direction different from that of the positive one. Thus the hunger-pangs may be allayed by compressing the stomach by tightening the belt or bending over, expedients which are decidedly not ways of satisfying an appetite. And, on the mental side, a sorrow of not having can also be eliminated by abandoning the positive desire, by a sort of withdrawal from the entire region (Lewin would say „aus dem Felde gehen“),<sup>45</sup> a turning away from the good thing and even forbidding one's imagination to play further with it.

We find, then, that full-fledged desire is, as a rule, a composition of (at least) two component desires, a positive and a negative one. And since there are cases in which there is both a displeasure of need and a sorrow of want - normal hunger would be a good example - there may be three component desires, e. g., (1) one for the beefsteak, (2) one away from the tantalizing sorrow of being excluded from it, and (3) one away from those awful hunger-pangs. Though ultimately arising from one and the same condition of the body (a disturbance of some homeostatic state), (1) and (2) are relatively independent of (3), and (2) though dependent upon (1), is yet not dependent upon it to such an extent that it could not, if forced to, seek alleviation in a way entirely its own.

There have been attempts to interpret all pleasure as pleasure of relief from some unpleasantness or pain. Plato, in the dialogue *Philebos*, admitted at least one exception, the pleasure derived from beautiful colors, shapes, tones. etc., because one could forego them without pain;<sup>46</sup> while von Frey, having discovered sense organs for pain, and not seeing how the same service could be rendered to pleasure, allowed himself to be carried away to the sweeping assertion that pleasure is nothing but relief from pain.<sup>47</sup> Such theories belong in the same class as the theory that pleasure is nothing but a tending toward the object, or Nafe's statement that pleasure is - is, mind you, not goes with - a bright pressure in the upper chest region.<sup>48</sup> Statements such as these are incompatible with elementary phenomenological observations.

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<sup>45</sup> Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, ch. III, p. 90.

<sup>46</sup> *Philebos*, 51 a-b.

<sup>47</sup> M. von Frey, *Die Gefühle und ihr Verhältnis zu den Empfindungen*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 17.

<sup>48</sup> John Paul Nafe, "An Experimental Study of the Affective Qualities," *Amer. J. Psychol.* vol. XXXV (1924), pp. 507-544.

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Before we leave the case of negative desire, it might be well to mention a case which, in some respects, is the opposite of it: the holding on to an actual pleasant experience. Though not pointing to something that is not yet realized at all, it is at least closely related to a positive desire: a continuation of it after fulfillment has set in. It does not, however, present any new problem.<sup>49</sup>

16. The fourth component of desire, namely some unpleasantness of want in the real situation, differs from the other three components (the anticipation, the empathetical feeling tone, and the tendency to realize the anticipated situation and feeling tone) in that it is not absolutely essential. The circumstances of the example of the disappointment mentioned above might already have convinced us that there are cases of desire in which the actual situation is pleasant rather than unpleasant. I am referring to the important phenomenon of *joyful anticipation*, „Vorfreude“ in German,<sup>50</sup> the necessary condition of which, besides the goodness of the thing anticipated, is some „likelihood or certainty of attainment.“ A joy of anticipation is interesting not only as the converse of the sorrow of exclusion, but also as one major reason for mistaking the pleasantness in the objective of pure desire for an actual feeling tone. Joyful anticipation, i. e., the joy in looking forward to, which has rightly been called the better part of the enjoyment, arises from the situation represented by our Fig. 2 if one substitutes for the barrier *b* the open path *o* and for the  $-$ sign in *rs* a  $+$ sign. For joyful anticipation is indeed an actual feeling tone of pleasantness residing in the actual experience of looking forward to. It belongs to the „joys and sorrows of desire.“

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<sup>49</sup> Shand, in his endeavor to attribute every emotion a specific tendency, ascribes to joy a tendency to maintain the *status quo*. (*The Foundations of Character*, pp. 281 f.) My only objection would be that any kind of pleasure must be credited with such a tendency, sensory no less than emotional pleasantness. Mc Dougall and others have likewise stressed the "sustaining" influence of pleasant outcome upon response, though I would not call this particularly consistent with a hormic point of view. A less direct effect of pleasure is postulated in Trolands "hedonism of the past" (L. T. Troland, *The Fundamentals of Human Motivation*, New York, 1928, ch. 17), and in Thorndike's "law of effect": Pleasure is supposed to "stamp in" the response that led to it by increasing synaptic conductance (see, e. g., E. L. Thorndike, *Human Learning*, New York and London, 1931). For a more recent interpretation of the underlying facts see Tolman (E. C. Tolman. *Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men*, New York and London, 1932).

<sup>50</sup> The fact that the German language has a genuine and frequently used expression for what the English language has to reach by way of such awkward circumlocutions as "looking forward with pleasure" or "joyful anticipation" is in itself an interesting symptom of the English aversion for overt indulgence in emotions that "cross the bridge before they come to it." The whole sphere of language, expressions concerned with joy and enjoyments (and their negative counterparts) would make a most interesting topic for a comparative psychology of national differences. (Cf. besides "Vorfreude" such still less translatable words as "Wehmut," "Spannung," etc.)

But is all pleasant anticipation necessarily of the nature of a „joy that something good is ahead“? Could not at least a part of it be an

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actual foretaste or sip of the very pleasure to come? Indeed we find that pleasant anticipation exists in two forms: as „joyful anticipation“ which is always a joy - and as „pleasant foretaste“ which shares the particular nature of what is anticipated and which therefore may be sensory.

*Pleasant foretaste* may best be introduced by the discussion of a closely related phenomenon: *pleasant daydreaming*. In a daydream one may actually manage to smuggle oneself into the anticipated situation to such a degree that, psychologically, this situation almost becomes one's real situation. The pleasure enjoyed in this kind of indirect realization is naturally of the same kind as the pleasure that would have been enjoyed if the situation had been objectively realized. Daydreaming, then, is a kind of degeneration of desire into unreality (objectively speaking).<sup>51</sup>

It is interesting to note that not all desires lend themselves equally well to daydreaming. The „higher,“ cognitive-emotional or „personal“ desires are well suited to it because a consciousness that some thing is the case is relatively easy to imagine, though it may not be at all easy to believe in. There is also a type of sensory desire that, for another reason, is rather efficient in surreptitious realization: erotic desire. It is a peculiarity of sex - as over against the gustatory sphere, for example - that the sensory processes „released“ by the object have an unfolding and life of their own. A wave of amorous excitement needs only to be „started,“ and for that an „idea“ may be an efficient stimulus. On the other hand, the taste of a good wine requires constant stimulation through actual contact between peripheral receptors and the chemical nature of the object. Gustatory desires are notorious for their reluctance to be „cheated“ into gratification (cf. - in nocturnal dreams - the ghostly insipidness of a bite that had looked tasty enough).<sup>52</sup>

Now, such actual pleasant experiences as may be aroused through intense imagination are not limited to the self-sufficient twilight of

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<sup>51</sup> Three kinds of people are likely to take to it: children, introverts, and aged people. In the latter case - with the greater part of life lying behind, and the process of life no longer flowing so richly - the store of memory supplies welcome material for reliving by way of daydreams, spiced perhaps with a grain or two of belated wisdom.

<sup>52</sup> This difference between realism of hunger (or appetite) and the relative gullibility of the other needs has not been sufficiently recognized. Otherwise some psychoanalysts would not have committed the blunder of extending the concept of "libido" to all sensory enjoyments; and their "pleasure principle" would have had a less sexual connotation. To reserve "pleasure" for sex and to place gustatory enjoyment in the domain of a "reality principle" is a mistake that bears witness to an utter lack of phenomenological labor. The Marxian materialists, too, seem to have overlooked the difference. If they had not modeled human nature so one-sidedly after the realism of hunger, they would have been less likely to underrate the psychological reality of those "illusions" with which the masses have shown themselves to be so easily pleased.



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daydreaming, but often form, admixed to the joy component, an essential element of a total pleasure of anticipation. This is what we have called „pleasant foretaste.“ Like daydreaming, it is a kind of surreptitious realization. But while daydreaming is a flight from reality, a surrogate and makeshift arising from the unattainability of the goal in the real course of events, and often killing off what real determination still remains - foretaste, on the contrary, is a step toward reality, a prelude arising from certainty of attainment or rather from actual progress in the direction of realization. In this dynamical nature of foretaste lies a most important difference between it and daydreaming, but except for this one point, foretaste is of one piece with daydreaming.

What are the criteria by which to distinguish between joy of anticipation and pleasant foretaste? If there were no such criteria we could not even be absolutely sure that there actually existed two forms of pleasant anticipation. As a matter of fact, I myself had at first been inclined to interpret all pleasant anticipation as foretaste - until I came upon some facts that seemed to testify the independent existence of a „joy that a good thing is in store“: (1) There is pleasant anticipation in a domain where foretaste and daydreaming are almost impossible: in desire for food. (2) One can excite pleasant anticipation by promising a very wonderful thing without specifying what it is. How, then, could this pleasantness be a foretaste? From such instances in my own experience I am not under the impression that this pleasure is a foretaste of certain specific delights in terms of which I had hastened to interpret the unknown good ahead. (3) Take a child who has been told that he is soon to have a piece of candy and watch him jumping around, clapping his hands, and glowing all over with happiness; compare this behavior with that displayed in the very act of devouring the candy. Discounting those technicalities of eating that would simply not have permitted such ample gestures, there still remains sufficient difference (e. g., the shining vs. the greedily absorbed facial expression) to suggest a real difference in the type of hedonic experience.

We have, then, found that pleasant anticipation may be either a joy of looking forward to or a foretaste of, what is ahead, or a blending of the two. Our main result, however, consists in the recognition that (1) the actual state of an individual steeped in desire may be unpleasant or pleasant, depending upon the likelihood of attainment, and that (2) the empathetical feeling-tone of pleasantness in pure desire should not be confused with the actual feeling-tone in either of the two forms of pleasant anticipation.

The joy of anticipation belongs to what Shand has so aptly de-

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scribed as „the six prospective emotions of desire“:<sup>53</sup> hope, anxiety, disappointment, despondency, confidence, and despair - which „depend on some supposed change of situation, affecting the prospective fulfillment of its end...“<sup>54</sup> If somebody in hope feels sufficiently assured, „hope“ changes to „joy of anticipation,“ and if its object is realized, to „joy of attainment“; while „anxiety,“ if the dreaded event is known to be inescapable, settles down to sorrow of want, and so forth. To another tenet of Shand's, however, I am not able to subscribe whole-heartedly: the antagonism of desire and joy.<sup>55</sup> I am under the impression that Shand has neglected the difference between the joy of looking forward and the joy of daydreaming. It is the latter rather than the former that must be said to take the wind out of the sails of desire.

17. Desire, in its various forms and elaborations, is not the only way in which pleasure may refer to felt striving. There is a certain kind of striving which is related to pleasure in a much more indirect way. We have learned that desire exists only in a state of body and mind in which one would be capable of feeling the actual pleasantness if the anticipated situation or experience were actually given, that is, in a state attuned to, or sensitized for the pleasant experience in question. Otherwise no empathetical feeling-tone would wield that peculiar „soliciting“ power that is so characteristic of desire. There is, however, the case of the gourmet or epicure who, not yet in desire, creates the prerequisites of desire in order to exploit it. Hence his preparations for desire are guided by a striving that is not desire, although it too bears some kind of reference to a pleasure ahead.

Whereas desire is headed for something already pervaded by an (empathetical) feeling-tone of pleasantness, and is so in proportion to the intensity of this feeling-tone, regardless of what one may know will happen but a moment later - a sexual desire or a desire for revenge is not, as a desire, weakened by any prospect of the brevity of enjoyment; this new type of striving is altogether more rational and systematic, i. e., prudent, much more a long-term affair, weighing nearby pleasures against far-off pains in terms of what is known, not empathetically felt, as to their relative strengths and durations and as to their remote repercussions. This type of striving with reference to pleasure is precisely what Bishop Butler has so aptly described under the heading of the „cool principle of self-love“: „One man rushes upon certain ruin for the gratification of a present desire: nobody will call the principle of this action self-love. Suppose another man

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, pp. 462-504.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid* p. 465.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 509-517 and Appendix III

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to go through some laborious work upon promise of a great reward without any distinct knowledge what the regard will be: this course of action cannot be ascribed to any particular passion. The former of the actions is plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection, the latter as plainly to the general affection or principle of self-love.<sup>56</sup> No matter what we choose to call it - personally I consider terms like „cool self-love“ or „general desire for our own happiness“ to be somewhat misleading denotations - there exists a tendency of this nature, different from desire, but likewise related to future pleasure. Let us call it *pursuit of enjoyment*. That pleasure is only known, not forefelt, in cool self-love or pursuit of enjoyment, does not seem to preclude the possibility of feeling some sort of joy of anticipation or sorrow of exclusion, but surely it precludes the possibility of pleasant foretaste and displeasure of need, because *they* presuppose that very sensitization for the particular pleasure which, naturally, a mere knowledge of pleasure lacks.

It is with regard to the difference between sensory, dynamical, vital, and aesthetic enjoyment, on the one hand, and personal enjoyment, or joy routed in sentiment, on the other hand, that pursuit of enjoyment is most conspicuously at variance with desire. An experience of desire as such does not seem to be differently structured whether it is some sensory consummation or some valued state of affairs that is anticipated. As objectives of the desires concerned, tasting the wine or for that matter, chasing the deer or listening to the symphony, is much of the same structure as knowing the victory of the good cause or contemplating the happiness and excellence of one I love. Pursuit of enjoyment, on the other hand, sharply distinguishes between the two classes of pleasure. Sensory, dynamical, vital, and aesthetic enjoyments may be aimed at and planned for. The deliberate acts of aiming and planning do not interfere with the cause of the enjoyment. Here there seems to exist that detachment between the root or cause, whatever this may be, of the pleasantness, and the act of pursuing it which makes it possible to pursue it without interfering with the cause. As for the enjoyment that springs from the fulfillment of a personal sentiment, however, aiming and planning would interfere with the very thing. Here the cause of the enjoyment, the sentiment, is so much a concern of „my own,“ so much an investment of my present personal self, something I live in now, being actually identical with it - that I cannot possibly shunt myself off to an equally detached concern for its outcome.

So much for a phenomenology. The rest will be theory.

18. We are now ready to summarize the findings of our phe-

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<sup>56</sup> Sermon I, note 2.

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nomenological analysis of desire: A(positive) desire consists of an act of anticipating - or putting oneself into - an as yet unreal situation which is aglow with an empathetical feeling-tone of pleasantness and which shows a tendency to become the real situation. This tendency may either be yielded to - in purposive action or in daydreaming - or it may be blocked by holding down (or aloof) the total anticipation. The real situation in desire is likely to be charged with an actual unpleasantness of want, which gives rise to a negative desire for relief. This unpleasantness of want may be a displeasure of need or a sorrow of want or both. If, however, there is likelihood of fulfillment, the situation becomes charged with a pleasant feeling-tone (be it a joy of anticipation or a pleasant foretaste or both), which resides in the very process of looking forward to the anticipated enjoyment. Desire is not to be confused with „pursuit of enjoyment“ which latter is directed toward pleasantness, which is not forefelt but only known. Pursuit of enjoyment seems to be incompatible with the unimpaired existence of a sentiment for the object whose enjoyment is pursued.

### CONCLUSION

19. We have taken great pains to unravel that interlacing of pleasure, cognition, emotion, and striving which had grown to such bewildering complexity when the hedonist and the hormist were reporting their various observations. So far we have committed ourselves to no theory, but have simply „followed up the threads“ in a purely phenomenological analysis. Now, however, knowing the issues as well as the subject-matter itself, we are ready for a theoretical discussion.

When a formerly neutral experience becomes imbued with an (actual or empathetical) feeling-tone of pleasantness or unpleasantness we are always justified in looking for some underlying *causes*, C. There are different types of causes: (1) In sensory enjoyment or displeasure the cause is not phenomenally given, but the physiologist is able to point to some causal event in the organism, such as the disturbance of a homeostatic state, the distension of a sensitive hollow, a damage to tissue, etc.<sup>57</sup> Whether or not we choose to call this or-

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<sup>57</sup> As the nature of the immediate cause or neural correlate of pleasantness does not concern us here, we need not go into the intricacies of the neurophysiological hypotheses in this field. The reader who likes to speculate on this subject in terms of modern science is referred so Ch. 11 of *The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness* by Beebe-Center. Here he will find a brief review of the theories of Lehmann, Marshall, Thorndike, Troland, Allport, Herrick, Marston, and others. For the relation of pleasantness to the thalamus, see the fascinating findings of H. Head and G. Holmes, "Sensory Disturbances from Cerebral Lesions," *Brain*, vol. XXXIV (1911), pp. 109-254.

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ganic condition or need or C itself a „conation“ or „tendency“ is of no import. It certainly (at least in the normal course of events) gives rise to experienced conations or tendencies, such as desires, intentions, actions, etc., as well as to those empathetical feeling-tones of pleasantness and actual feeling-tones of unpleasantness which we have recognized as being essential constituents of positive and negative desires. It is of great import, however, to note that the underlying cause C, the organic or neural condition itself, is not in any sense directed toward pleasantness or away from unpleasantness. If at all „directed“, it is directed toward some alteration of state and toward the object which this would require. It causes, or „kindles,“ the feeling-tone residing in the experience of this alteration and this object and, therefore, cannot be said to aim at the feeling-tone. So far as C is concerned, hormism is absolutely right in asserting that pleasure is the outcome, not the goal. This emphasis that pleasure must be the outcome of something is the justified core of hormism.

However, what is true of C is not true of the desire springing from C. For in desire, pleasure is a part of the very objective or goal. (And if we raise at all the question of whether the hedonic component is more of a goal than is the other - the neutral or qualitative - component, we should probably have to admit that it makes less sense to say that we seek the pleasantness for the sake of the flavor in which it inheres, than to say that we seek the flavor for the sake of the pleasantness inhering in it.) At any rate, the outer object is here clearly sought as a means toward pleasant experience. When we come to „pursuit of enjoyment,“ however, the picture becomes a decidedly hedonistic one. For in this case even C itself is sought as a means toward pleasant experience: we fan the appetite in order to enjoy the morsel. And since the neutral or qualitative features of the experience are not necessarily much affected by the absence or presence of C, and would, therefore, always be accessible (provided the object is), our effort to create C is plainly directed toward that feature that is, alone, entirely dependent upon the presence of C: the pleasantness. Here, then, we are unchangeably in possession of a case in which pleasantness itself is the goal - as both the object and the qualitative side of the experience may be accessible without satisfying the striving called pursuit of enjoyment.<sup>58</sup> (2) Although dynamical and aesthetic enjoyments are different from sensory enjoyment in that, for them, no equally palpable „bodily“ (or grossly physiological) cause C has so far been demonstrated, they nevertheless share with sensory enjoyment one very important property: the

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<sup>58</sup> It suffices here that there are *some* experiences the qualitative side of which is available or accessible despite the absence of C.

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object is sought on behalf of the experience, and pursuit of enjoyment is possible without impairing C and the experience. There exists, however, between aesthetic enjoyment and the other two kinds a difference in the nature of the pursuit of enjoyment that is well worth mentioning. When we complain, as we sometimes do, that this or that piece of art does not give us enjoyment, (or no longer gives us enjoyment), and when we try to do something to make it enjoyable, we do not „fan the appetite,“ but we try to „improve the understanding.“ For we are often aware that here is not the pleasantness which is missing in an otherwise scarcely altered experience, but that the experience itself, as it is, its present qualitative nature is unfit for enjoyment: it lacks expressiveness, intrinsic significance. Therefore, as far as aesthetic enjoyment is concerned, we have no proof that pleasantness as such is ever singled out to be the goal, as we did have in the pursuit of sensory pleasure. In other words: in the aesthetic field pursuit of enjoyment cannot be said to strive for the sheer pleasantness of the experience, because it always strives for a better understanding of the object as well, for a different and fuller qualitative experience. (3) In a third kind of enjoyment there is, as always, some C, i. e., some cause of desire and feeling-tone, directed toward some alteration of state and some objective situation - not toward the pleasantness or away from the unpleasantness of which it is the cause. Here the cause C is a personal sentiment. The nature of this cause account for the existence of a different kind of relationship between C and the desire. The desire for a beefsteak and the causal deficiency of blood sugar clearly belong to two different realms - so much so that the self feels the desire somehow „imposed upon it from the outside.“ And even in the desire for a good book, the underlying cause of the pleasantness does not involve any actual or personal attitude for the self. But in a desire that springs from a living sentiment, like that for the victory of a good cause, or for the happiness of my child, the underlying cause C is the sentiment itself. That is to say, C here is an actual conation of my personal self. The desire and its cause are of one piece. We have come upon several telling symptoms of this postulated unity: we can not deliberately try to call forth C (the sentiment) in order to reap the pleasant experience. We cannot aim at the enhancement of the object of our love in order to enjoy the experience, nor can we in an equally detached manner, „observe“ the experience - without destroying or at least impairing C and all the rest, the desire as well as the enjoyment. (Only if „love“ is no more than a means for obtaining sexual gratification, only then can we embark upon a pursuit of enjoyment. But then it is a case of sensory pleasure and belongs to type 1, not to type 3.)

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Again, no matter how we choose our terminology, here is a difference that is invariant against words. One cannot kill a difference. One might see an objection to this in that yearning exclamation: „Oh, if there were only something I could devote myself to, something to love and live for!“ At first sight a person saying this may resemble our gourmet: as the latter wishes for an appetite, so the former wishes for a sentiment. While experiencing the sentiment, he aims at its object, but when deserted by sentiment he aims at a sentiment, at C. This is, no doubt, a very important trait of human nature, showing that a sentiment is not a mere reaction, but the fulfillment of a need. However, it provides neither that such a person strives for the pleasantness of an experience nor even that he strives primarily for an experience. He simply strives for a certain objective situation, one, however, which contains the self, in much the same sense as does a person who longs to be loved or recognized or to excel his rivals.

In view of all the facts which have been mentioned, I propose to acknowledge the existence of a continuum extending from a „hedonoid“ to a „hormoid“ pole. If the case of the enjoyment of beefsteak and wine is a pretty „hedonoid“ one, the case of sentiment is by all measures less hedonoid. In proportion as C is my own present concern, so that I cannot well be expected to be able to „wait at the other end“ for the pleasure derived from it, we shall call the case in question a „hormoid“ one. In proportion as C and „I“ belong to two different systems, so that I am able to „graze off the pleasure that grows on C,“ we shall speak of a „hedonoid“ case. Now, the more hormoid (or the less hedonoid) a case is, the greater is the motivational and conscious prevalence of the qualitative or neutral side over the hedonic side. It may be counted as another confirmation of the existence of this polarity or dimension of difference that the hedonists have invariably tended to draw their examples and models of thought from the pole of sensory or aesthetic enjoyments, while the hormists have shown an equally marked predilection for cases that lie at the other end of the continuum.

To bring out the difference between our cases 1 and 3, the hedonoid and the hormoid ones, an instance of negative desire may be even more convincing. If I want to get rid of a pain in my tooth, all I know and care is that I want to be rid of the pain, and C, the cause of the pain (the damaging of tissue and the subsequent neural events, whether they consist in the stimulation of specific pain receptors, as von Frey believed, or the overstimulation of touch or other receptors) is obviously no affair of „mine.“ If, however, the pain is located, say, in the feeling of frustrated love, C is the very sentiment of love, and this sentiment is very much an affair of „mine.“ Or take

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the case which our hedonist considered to be one of his strongest points for hedonism, the pain of exclusion from a gay company one wants badly to join, but, alas, does not succeed in joining. The hedonist was right in pointing out that even in a case like this the pain may grow so strong, and become so much an affair of „its“ own, that all I want and care about is to get rid of it, even at the cost of killing C, by withdrawing from the scene. This certainly shows what the hedonist intended it to show, namely that unpleasantness is not merely the outcome of the frustration of one conation, but that it may also become the origin of a new conation (which is here in a sense the reverse of the positive conation of „pursuit of enjoyment“ in the gourmet). However it also shows another and most significant thing, namely that in this kind of personal „pain“ or „sorrow of exclusion“ the pain is actually experienced as deriving from the frustration of my very desire (here, my desire to join in). C, the cause of the unpleasantness of the situation, is nothing but my desire to join in. In other words, it shows again that there are cases where not only the desire (here the desire to escape from the pain of exclusion), but its cause C as well (the barrier to joining), is very much my own affair; cases where I live in both, and where it takes quite extreme circumstances to „cleave“ me into two subpersons, one of whom wants to join in while the other (a more peripheral one ) wants to get rid of the pain derived from not being able to join. A toothache and a pain of frustration thus lie close to the two opposite poles of the hedono-hormoid dimension. At the same time we come to realize that not only the joys and sorrows of sentiment, but also the joys and sorrows of desire, are of a hormoid, a relatively non-hedonistic, character. (4) The picture would not, however, be complete without mention of a fourth case, one which, by being mistaken for the whole story, has been largely responsible for blinding hormism to the specific merits of the other side. I am referring to the pleasure of achievement, the dynamical joy of succeeding, of victory. Such pleasure differs from the other cases, that of enjoying the wine or the book, or that of enjoying the love or excellence of another being, in that in it the success (or defeat) figures within the very object of pleasure, being the essential constituent of the very situation at which the joy (or sorrow) is felt. True, if winning the love or gaining admission to the group or getting the wine was difficult enough to give rise to a dynamical joy of success, there will be an element of the fourth type of enjoyment in the others. But to regard the pleasure of success as the prototype of all pleasure demands a great deal of one-sidedness on behalf of a theory.

20. I believe that I have shown (1) that neither hedonism nor



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hormism is a satisfactory account of the whole story of pleasure and striving; (2) that, on penetrating into the complexity of the matter, we face an objective polarity ranging from enjoyments of a „hedonoid“ to others of a „hormoid“ character; (3) that this polarity is absolutely clear in its objective nature; (4) that, subjectively speaking, much of the age-old controversy between hedonism and hormism has been due to the fact that the two sides have thought in terms of different cases without knowing it;<sup>59</sup> and finally, (5) that exploring the nature and relational intertwining of pleasure, cognition, emotion, and striving is in itself a fascinating and worthwhile enterprise of wide implications. Moreover I believe that our theoretical conclusion does justice to every one of the seventeen points selected from the best stocks of both sides, as well as to an unprejudiced phenomenology of the field of facts.

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<sup>59</sup> It might be a worthwhile task to study the chief representatives of hedonism and hormism from the point of view of typology. Recently Prof. Adams of Duke University told me that McDougall had been the type of man who fails really to appreciate sensory and artistic enjoyments, but that he had been a great golfer. When I pool this bit of information with what I already knew about the work of the great hormist, e. g., the number of strongly assertive books he wrote, his failure to attempt to give to art a proper place within his system, the overwhelming role which he assigned to self-regarding sentiments - I had no doubt as to what had made *this* man a hormist.